TEXT IN CONTEST: GENDER AND THE CONSTITUTION
FROM A SOCIAL MOVEMENT PERSPECTIVE
REVA B. SIEGEL'
INTRODUCTION
The American feminist movement has twice mobilized for constitutional change. The constitutional amendment secured by the firstwave feminist movement is no longer of consequence, while the constitutional amendment sought by the second-wave feminist movement
was never ratified. Yet today, courts and commentators agree that the
Constitution guarantees women equality, even if that guarantee was
never specifically authorized by the Constitution's framers. What understanding of our constitutional tradition might we glean from this
story of constitutional change?
In a recent article in the Harvard Law Review, David Strauss contends that the story of the Nineteenth Amendment and the Equal
Rights Amendment (ERA) proves the irrelevance of amendments in
our constitutional tradition, and more generally illustrates the insignificant role that constitutional text plays in the articulation of constitutional norms.' Women did not need the Nineteenth Amendment to
obtain the right to vote any more than they needed the ERA to obtain
modem sex equality law. Evolving gender mores would have led to
the enfranchisement of women by statute, just as evolving gender mores led the judiciary to afford women constitutional protection from
2
The manner in
regulation that enforces archaic gender norms.
incorporated a
progressively
has
tradition
which our constitutional
gender equality commitment demonstrates, for Strauss, that the story
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David A. Strauss, The Irrelevance of Constitutional Amendments, 114 HARV. L. REV.
1457 (2001) [hereinafter Strauss, Irrelevance].
2 See id. at 1476-78 (asserting that constitutional law today is essentially the same as
it would have been had the ERA been adopted); id. at 1499-503 (suggesting that the
lack of resistance to enforcement of the Nineteenth Amendment reveals that the
Amendment "ratif[ied] a permanent shift in political culture").
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about our Constitution that originalists and textualists tell is descriptively incorrect, and, as he elsewhere argues, normatively unattractive
as well. :
In this Article, I will be drawing on the stories of the ERA and the
Nineteenth Amendment to demonstrate that the Constitution's text
plays a more significant role in our constitutional tradition than
Strauss contends. My purpose is not to defend the arguments of
originalists and textualists that Strauss is endeavoring to refute,4 but
instead to explore some alternatives to the traditions of reasoning
about text that Strauss criticizes.
As Strauss observes, text is privileged in the American constitutional tradition "because someone with authority adopted it"; at root,
"[t]his authoritative tradition sees the law as the command of a sovereign."5 In the American tradition, it is the People who are sovereign,
authors of the Constitution's text.
Strauss challenges this understanding of our constitutional tradition on positive and normative grounds. As Strauss understands our
constitutional tradition, text is inessential to constitutional interpretation and amendment is inconsequential as a method of constitutional
change. "Discrete, decisive, formal amendatory acts, supposedly by
the sovereign People, are at most a minor part of the process of constitutional change."" Invocation of the Constitution's text keeps alive
the myth that it is the People who are authors of the Constitution.
But in fact it is judges making judgments about precedent, tradition,
and evolving social understandings who make decisions in the Consti-

3 See David A. Strauss, Common
Law ConstitutionalInterpretation,63 U. CHI. L. REv.
877, 879 (1996) [hereinafter Strauss, Common Law] ("The common law approach... is
more justifiable in abstract terms than textualism or originalism, and provides a far
better account of our practices."); see also Strauss, Irrelevance,supra note 1, at 1461 & n.8
(noting the conceptual linkages between articles arguing that amendments and text
play a limited role in our constitutional tradition).
4 Strauss observes:
[T]he terms of debate in American constitutional law continue to be set by
the view that principles of constitutional law must ultimately be traced to the
text of the Constitution, and by the allied view that when the text is unclear
the original understandings must control. An air of illegitimacy surrounds
any alleged departure from the text or the original understandings.... But
textualism and originalism remain inadequate models for understanding
American constitutional law.
Strauss, Common Law, supra note 3, at 878-79.
5 Id. at
885.
Strauss, Irrelevance,supra note 1,
at 1465.
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tution's name: "[I] t is the common law approach, not the approach
that connects law to an authoritative text, or an authoritative decision
by the Framers or by 'we the people,' that best explains, and best justifies, American constitutional law today."7
In this Article, I challenge Strauss's claims about the "irrelevance"
of the ERA and the Nineteenth Amendment with the objective of calling into question this common-law, and fundamentally juricentric,
understanding of our constitutional tradition.
Both the ERA and the Nineteenth Amendment demonstrate how
the text of the Constitution makes the terms of our constitutional tradition amenable to contestation by mobilized groups of citizens, acting inside and outside the formal procedures of the legal system. It is,
most often, as text that the Constitution is the object of social movement struggle. Text matters in our tradition because it is the site of understandings and practices that authorize, encourage, and empower ordinary citizens to make claims on the Constitution'smeaning.
These features of our tradition disappear in Strauss's account, because as Strauss models our constitutional tradition, he focuses, nearly
exclusively, on the official pronouncements of judges. Not only
judges and courtroom lawyers, however, but elected officials and ordinary citizens regularly make claims about the Constitution. In so
doing, they may follow the Court's reading of the Constitution, but often they do not, explicitly "differentiat[ing] between the Constitution
and the Court."8 In our constitutional tradition, a network of understandings about the Constitution as text authorizes nonjuridical
speakers to make claims about the Constitution that diverge from the
Court's.' Americans act on these understandings through a variety of

7 Strauss, Common Law, supra note 3, at 879.

8 MICHAEL KAMMEN, A MACHINE THAT WOULD GO OF ITSELF: THE CONSTITUTION
IN AMERICAN CULTURE 9 (1986) (invoking the claims of Andrew Jackson, Abraham
Lincoln, and Franklin Delano Roosevelt).
9 Sandy Levinson describes this body of understandings as the "Protestant" strain
in the American constitutional tradition. SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH
27 (1988). He explains, "' [P] rotestantism' herein refers to either (1) an emphasis on
the exclusivity of written Scripture or text as the basis of doctrine, or (2) the legitimacy
of individual (or at least relatively nonhierarchical communitarian) interpretation as
against the claims of a specific, hierarchically organized institution." Id. Hendrick
Hartog describes this understanding as "a faith that the received meanings of constitutional texts will change when confronted by the legitimate aspirations of autonomous
citizens and groups," observing that "[s]uch a faith has survived even when aspirations
ran contrary to ruling doctrines of constitutional law." Hendrik Hartog, The Constitution of Aspiration and "The Rights That Belong to Us All", 74 J. AM. HIST. 1013, 1014
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practices, including, but not limited to, Article V amendments.
The judge-centered framework in which Strauss and many other
constitutional theorists describe our constitutional tradition obscures
communicative pathways that connect judicial reasoning inside the
courts to claims made about the Constitution by persons outside the
courts. There are, of course, many such pathways in our constitutional system. Some are explicit elements of constitutional design,
such as the Article V procedures for amendment, or the roles played
by the legislative and executive branches in designing and staffing the
court system and enforcing its decrees. Others have grown up in the
interstices of these institutional arrangements. The rise of the party
system is one such vehicle, and social movements are another.
Throughout American history, groups of Americans have mobilized to make interpretive and amendatory claims on the Constitution's text, yet constitutional theory rarely recognizes the role that social movements play in the construction of constitutional meaning. 0
This omission is consequential, for if judges have played the central
role in articulating constitutional norms in the American tradition,
their understanding of the Constitution has been deeply shaped by
mobilized citizenry, acting through electoral processes," and outside
of them. 2 In exploring the role of social movements in shaping constitutional meaning, this Article joins the small but rapidly growing
body of constitutional theory written in law schools that examines the
(1987).
Akhil Amar quite self-consciously criticizes judicial interpretation of the Constitution within this tradition. As he put it recently, "[w]hat the American People have said
and done in the Constitution is often more edifying, inspiring, and sensible than what
the Justices have said and done in the case law." Akhil Reed Amar, The Supreme Court,
1999 Term-Foreword: The Document and the Doctrine, 114 HARV. L. REV. 26, 27 (2000)
(invoking the Constitution as a "document" as a basis for criticizing understandings of
the Constitution contained in doctrine).
10 Legal historians have documented the ways that
social movements have endeavored to bring about constitutional reform, but very few constitutional theorists have
addressed the role of social movements in the creation of constitutional meaning. But
see infra note 14.
l See 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE:

TRANSFORMATIONS 255-383 (1998)

(analyzing the role played by electoral politics in reshaping constitutional jurisprudence of the New Deal Era).
12 For some accounts of the ways
that the labor movement has participated in
shaping constitutional understandings, see William E. Forbath, Caste, Class, and Equal
Citizenship,98 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1999); and Drew D. Hansen, The Sit-Down Strikes and the
Switch in Time, 46 WAYNE L. REV. 49 (2000). For some accounts of the ways that the
modern civil rights movement has participated in shaping constitutional understandings, see infra note 38.
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3
life of the Constitution outside the courts.1

Relatively little of this scholarship concerns social movements. One branch
of
the scholarship on the Constitution outside the courts criticizes judicial review in a variety of different frameworks. For example, Mark Tushnet has recently argued for a
populist constitutionalism that involves the abolition of judicial supremacy. MARK
13

TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999).

Cass Sunstein

argues that judges should decide cases in accordance with an ethic of minimalism that
would restrict the practical scope of judicial review without calling into question the
CASS R.
Court's role as the ultimate expositor of the Constitution's meaning.
SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT 3-60

(1999). Akhil Amar, by contrast, cultivates a general skepticism about the Court's capacity to interpret the document in fidelity to its meaning and emphasizes that the
Constitution is the People's. See, e.g., Amar, supra note 9 (contrasting the Constitution
as "document" and "doctrine"). Along related lines, Jack Balkin and Sandy Levinson
have argued for refashioning our constitutional canon so that it includes expositors of
the Constitution speaking from positions outside the courts. J.M. Balkin & Sanford
Levinson, The Canons of ConstitutionalLaw, 111 HARV. L. REV. 963, 1003-06 (1998); see
also J.M. Balkin, Populism and Progressivism as Constitutional Categories, 104 YALE L.J.
1935, 1950 & n.40 (1995) (discussing populist strains in American constitutional theory). For a thoughtful review of some of these trends in legal scholarship, see James E.
Fleming, The Constitution Outside the Courts, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 215, 240-49 (2000),
reviewing TUSHNET, supra.
Another and growing branch of scholarship explores the differences between legislative and judicial enforcement of the Constitution. Lawrence Sager has written several highly influential articles in this tradition. See, e.g., Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair
Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212
(1978) (arguing that elected officials may have different competence, authority, and
obligation to enforce constitutional norms than do judges); Lawrence G. Sager,Justice
in Plain Clothes: Reflections on the Thinness of ConstitutionalLaw, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 410,
435 (1993) (offering an account of our constitutional practice "in which we understand ourselves to be ...constitutionally obliged to address the injustice of poverty and
entrenched racial disadvantage, but see the primary addressees of this obligation as
elected officials rather than judges"). For more recent contributions exploring Congress's role in interpreting Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment, see Evan H.
Caminker, "Appropriate"Means-Ends Constraints on Section 5 Powers, 53 STAN. L. REV.
1127 (2001); and Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Equal ProtectionBy Law: FederalAntidiscrimination Legislation After Morrison and Kimel, 110 YALE L.J. 441 (2000). Larry
Kramer examines the popular or democratic character of the American constitutional
tradition in a rich historical account focused especially on its founding decades. Larry
Kramer, The Supreme Court, 2000 Term-Foreword: We the Court, 115 HARV. L. REV. 4
(2001). For other historical discussions of these themes, see, for example,James Gray
Pope, Republican Moments: The Role of Direct PopularPower in the American Constitutional
Order, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 287, 325-44 (1990), discussing the founding; and Post & Siegel, supra, at pts. III.C., IV.B, discussing the Warren Court era.
Finally, for literature exploring the concept ofjudicial supremacy itself, see Larry
Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial ConstitutionalInterpretation, 110 HARV.
L. REV. 1359 (1997); Neal Devins & Louis Fisher, JudicialExclusivity and PoliticalInstability, 84 VA. L. REv. 83 (1998); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217 (1994); Christopher L. Eisgruber, The
Most Competent Branches: A Response to Professor Paulsen, 83 GEO. L.J. 347 (1994); and
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To date, the constitutional theorist most concerned about emphasizing the role of a mobilized citizenry in the making of constitutional
law has been Bruce Ackerman. 14 Ackerman has argued that courts can
and should recognize constitutional amendments that do not satisfy
Article V criteria, when judges discern mobilized majorities acting
through the electoral process in patterns Ackerman calls constitutional moments. If judges tie constitutional interpretation to such
electoral signaling, Ackerman argues, changes in judicial interpretation of the Constitution are appropriately anchored in values of popular sovereignty.' 5
Ackerman challenges the dichotomy between amendment and interpretation, and presents a rich account of constitutional change
whose protagonists include elected officials as well as judges. But
Ackerman's account continues to conceptualize social mobilization as
an amendment analogue, a form of democratic lawmaking. Judges
are justified in adopting new constitutional understandings when mobilized majorities achieve electoral victories that satisfy the rule of rec16
ognition Ackerman characterizes as a constitutional moment.
This Article discusses the role of social movements in shaping
constitutional meaning in a different framework. For present pur-

Mark Tushnet, Reflections on City of Boerne v. Flores: Two Versions ofJudicialSupremacy,
39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 945 (1998).
14 See, e.g., ] BRUCE ACKERMAN,
WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 19 (1991) [hereinafter 1 ACKERMAN] ("This country's Constitution focuses with special intensity on the
rare moments when transformative movements earn broad and deep support for their
initiatives."); 2 ACKERMAN, supra note 11, at 5 ("[T]he Constitution cannot be understood without recognizing that Americans have, time and time again, successfully repudiated large chunks of their past and transformed their higher law to express deep
changes in their political identities.").
James Pope and William Forbath have chronicled the ways the labor movement
has contested constitutional understandings. Their studies, written at the intersection
of legal history and legal theory, represent an especially important account of constitutionalism from the standpoint of social movements. See, e.g., James Gray Pope, Labor's
Constitutionof Freedom, 106 YALE LJ. 941, 942 (1997) (presenting labor's constitution of
freedom as a struggle for fundamental rights such as "the rights to organize, to assemble, to speak freely, and-above all-to strike"); Forbath, supra note 12, at 58-61 (describing the constitutional claims of early twentieth-century labor activists). Jules Lobel
has explored the ways social movements have used aspirational litigation to challenge
the courts' interpretation of the Constitution. SeeJules Lobel, Losers, Fools & Prophets:
Justice as Struggle, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1331, 1332 (1995) ("Litigation may serve to legitimate a political movement, to publicize the issues raised by that movement, and
perhaps to spur political action.").
1 1 ACKERMAN, supra note
14.
16 Id.
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poses, I am unconcerned with the question of whether the activities of
a social movement amount to lawmaking that satisfies the Article V
rule of recognition or the form of a constitutional moment. In contradistinction to Ackerman, I locate social movements in a framework
of constitutional culture rather than constitutional lawmaking. By
"constitutional culture" I refer to the network of understandings and
practices that structure our constitutional tradition, including those
that shape law but would not be recognized as "lawmaking" according
7
to the legal system's own formal criteria.'
In this Article, I will be reflecting on the understandings and practices that empower nonjuridical actors to contest, and sometimes to
reshape, authoritative understandings of our Constitution. Rather
than examine these processes through the filter of the questionsShould a judge heed the claims of nonjuridical actors? Are these
claims about constitutional meaning law?-this Article invites
constitutional theory to develop more complex positive accounts of
the practices through which nonjuridical actors participate in the
production of constitutional meaning.
During periods of constitutional mobilization, citizens make
claims about the Constitution's meaning in a wide variety of social settings. Sometimes such mobilizations result in constitutional amendments; most often they do not. But even when no formal act of lawmaking occurs, constitutional contestation nonetheless plays an
important role in transforming understandings about the Constitution's meaning inside and outside the courts. If we liberate our account of constitutional change from frameworks that are concerned
with determining whether lawmaking has occurred, we can give a
richer account of the ways that debates about the Constitution outside
the courts shape constitutional understandings inside the courts.
Considered from this vantage point, dialogue between citizenry and
judiciary about constitutional meaning is far more commonplace in
our constitutional order than constitutional theory commonly acknowledges.
There are other ways that criteria concerned with constitutional
lawmaking may unduly restrict our understanding of constitutional
mobilizations. Lawmaking criteria filter out information concerning
the ways that nonjuridical actors participate in constitutional change;
lawmaking criteria also impose a particular structure on the ways we

17

Infra text accompanying notes 55-72.
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understand the character of constitutional controversies. For example, it is common to characterize the purpose of constitutional
amendments in instrumentalist terms, having in view the regulation of
human conduct.'8 So understood, the task of constitutional interpretation is to determine the nature of the constitutional constraints past
generations have imposed upon us.
We certainly can read our constitutional development through
the filter of such instrumentalist assumptions, but this way of proceeding will screen out much of what motivates citizens and elected officials to take positions in constitutional controversies. A closer look at
the dynamics of constitutional mobilization and countermobilization
suggests that the frameworks in which citizens reason about constitutional change are more complex than conventions for describing constitutional change generally recognize.
We can ignore or repress this complexity in order to adduce the
decision rules that past generations of Americans have adopted to
govern our lives. But imposing such a restrictive filter on the ways we
understand constitutional change may not serve us well, given all the
ways we reason about the past in the course of wrestling with questions
of constitutional law. History matters in our constitutional culture,
not merely because it is a source of constraint, but because it is a
source of understanding that guides our judgments and gives them
meaning. Given the many reasons we consult history in the course of
reasoning about the Constitution's meaning, lawmaking criteria do
not supply an adequate framework in which to describe constitutional
mobilizations of times past.
This Article situates the question of constitutional change in a
framework concerned with constitutional culture rather than constitutional lawmaking and calls for a thicker description of the understandings and practices through which mobilized groups of Americans
regularly endeavor to shape the Constitution's meaning. In this account, the People's authority to speak to constitutional questions matters. Text and amendment matter, but not in the familiar lawmaking
framework that Strauss criticizes. Yet if such a description of the ways
that mobilized groups of citizens shape constitutional understandings
will not conform in all particulars to familiar accounts of constitutional lawmaking, it may nonetheless be of internal significance to

18 See, e.g.,
infra notes 49-52 and 73-74 (discussing this instrumentalist understanding of constitutional law).
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constitutional law.
Constitutional theory presupposes some model of jurisgenesis
whenever it addresses the roles that judges, elected officials, and mobilized citizenry play in the creation of constitutional law. In an era
when the role of judges was under sustained critical assault, constitutional theory devoted considerable efforts to exploring the practice of
judicial review. Indeed, we can locate David Strauss's arguments for
common law constitutionalism in this tradition. 9
As the Supreme Court has most recently posed the question of judicial review, however, it has reoriented the question away from the
countermajoritarian difficulty and the prerogative of judges to interpret the Constitution, and instead put in issue the prerogative of nonjuridical actors to participate in defining the Constitution's meaning.
The Court is now sharply restricting Congress's power to enforce the
Fourteenth Amendment, on the grounds that differences between legislative and judicial enforcement of the Constitution are an affront to
judicial supremacy and the Court's power to say what the law is.20 In

19 For decades, the Supreme Court's critics have cautioned against judicial
"law-

making" in matters of constitutional adjudication, emphasizing that change through
constitutional amendment is more democratic than change through constitutional interpretation. In these accounts, the Constitution's text and its amendment through
Article V figure primarily as constraints on judges' discretion to interpret the Constitution. David Strauss is endeavoring to refute these traditions of reasoning about constitutional interpretation when he argues that text plays an insignificant role in constitutional interpretation and Article V is "irrelevant" as a mechanism of constitutional
change. Strauss, Irrelevance, supra note 1, at 1459. For Strauss, adjudication is the
paradigmatic form of constitutional lawmaking, and judicial interpretation is its core
practice. His argument for common law constitutionalism advances, in provocatively
strong form, understandings that now animate diverse accounts ofjudicial review.
Constitutional theorists commonly discuss the courts' obligation to read constitutional precedent in light of the evolving ethos of the nation. Yet in such accounts,
courts engage in doctrinal and ethical modalities of interpretation, along with other
modes of interpretation based on text, original understanding, and structure. See, e.g.,
PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1991) (analyzing how constitutional argument draws upon different modalities of constitutional interpretation).
Strauss emphasizes the centrality of doctrinal and ethical argument in a way that sets
him apart; he insists that arguments from text and original understanding do not, and
should not, play a significant role in our constitutional tradition. In refusing to accord
arguments from text and original understanding the usual deference, Strauss seems
intent on liberating the practice of constitutional interpretation from the taint of illegitimacy critics of judicial review have bestowed upon it. Strauss, Common Law, supra
note 3, at 878-79.
20 See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997) ("[T]he
Constitution is
preserved best when each part of the Government respects.., the actions and determinations of the other branches. When the Court has interpreted the Constitution, it
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short, the Court has drawn into question the role that democratic
bodies play in interpreting the Constitution. Under these circumstances, it is important to examine more closely how nonjuridical actors have participated in forging constitutional understandings we
venerate today.
Who has authority to interpret the Constitution? One needs a
positive account of the roles that different institutions and actors have
played in shaping the Constitution's meaning before one can build a
normative theory that defines relationships among institutions and actors who make conflicting claims about the Constitution's meaning.
Developing a richer understanding of the dynamics of constitutional
change sheds light on this question of constitutional interpretation
and many others. Liberating our descriptive account of constitutional
change from the constraints of lawmaking paradigms may make an
important difference in the ways we understand the questions at stake
in many chapters of our constitutional development, and, more generally, the practice of constitutional interpretation itself.
While this Article is organized as a rejoinder to Strauss's provocative thesis about the irrelevance of constitutional amendments, I have
framed my argument in terms that reach beyond Strauss's thesis to
engage assumptions that he shares with many other constitutional
theorists. Strauss is hardly alone in modeling constitutional theory in
terms that focus on the courts, that occlude pathways through which
popular mobilizations help produce constitutional meaning, or that
emphasize constitutional lawmaking as a framework for thinking
about the dynamics of constitutional change. This Article thus builds
a response to Strauss into a call for examining those aspects of constitutional theory that obscure the role that social movements play in
shaping constitutional meaning.
Part I of this Article responds to Strauss's claims about the irrelevance of the ERA. Here I reflect on the significance that popular mo-

has acted within the province of the Judicial Branch, which embraces the duty to say
what the law is."); seealso Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 121 S. Ct. 955, 968
(2001) ("[T]o uphold the [Americans with Disabilities] Act's application to the states
would allow Congress to rewrite the Fourteenth Amendment law laid down by the
Court...."); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 620 (2000) (declaring 42 U.S.C.
§ 13981, the civil rights remedy of the Violence Against Women Act, unconstitutional
because "the Fourteenth Amendment place[s] certain limitations on the manner in
which Congress may attack discriminatory conduct"). For discussion of the Court's
new Section Five jurisprudence, see Caminker, supra note 13; Post & Siegel, supra note
13; and infra text accompanying notes 114-132.
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bilization may have in the formation of constitutional law, even where
such mobilization does not satisfy criteria for an Article V amendment. Part II of this Article explores different frameworks in which we
might describe the relationship of law and society as we reason about
the dynamics of constitutional change, and it illustrates how our account of constitutional change varies as we describe it from the standpoint of constitutional lawmaking and constitutional culture. Part III
of this Article responds to Strauss's claims about the irrelevance of the
Nineteenth Amendment. Here I consider how describing social
movement challenges to entrenched constitutional understandings in
a framework attentive to questions of constitutional culture rather
than constitutional lawmaking may change the ways we reason about
the meaning of an Article V amendment. The Conclusion considers
how this account of the role that social movements play in shaping
constitutional meaning can be brought to bear on disputes about the
role of Congress and the Court in interpreting the Constitution.
I.

THE ORIGINS OF SEX DISCRIMINATIONJURISPRUDENCE:
COMMON LAW AND SOCIAL MOVEMENT PERSPECTIVES

In The Irrelevance of ConstitutionalAmendments, Strauss invokes the
rise of sex discrimination law to demonstrate that text plays an insignificant role in our constitutional tradition. As he observes, during
the 1970s, the federal judiciary adopted a new understanding of the
equal citizenship norm, even though the amendment proposing this
understanding was never ratified:
Today, it is difficult to identify any respect in which constitutional law is
different from what it would have been if the ERA had been adopted.
For the last quarter-century, the Supreme Court has acted as if the Constitution2 1contains a provision forbidding discrimination on the basis of
gender.

For Strauss, the growth of modern sex discrimination law demonstrates the "irrelevance" of the ERA.22 Judges changed the way they
interpreted the Constitution in response to the "developments in society" that prompted demands for a constitutional amendment, and
this change in interpretation was appropriate, Strauss argues, even if
the ERA was never formally ratified:

21

22

Strauss, Irrelevance,supra note 1, at 1476-77 (footnotes omitted).
Id. at 1477.

308

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 150:297

[I] t would be a mistake to say that an overly activist Court "ratified" the
ERA in the face of a contrary verdict from the country. What "ratified"
the ERA, in effect, was the same kind of thing that "ratified" the Child
Labor Amendment: insistent pressure from society as a whole. In the
case of the ERA, this took the form of the increasing presence of women
in the workplace, in politics, and in other new roles. Instead of saying
that the courts imposed an agenda on society, it is probably more accurate to say that the opposite occurred: because of developments in society, the Court would have found it very difficult to continue treating
gender classifications as unproblematic.

Strauss thus understands the rise of modern sex discrimination jurisprudence to demonstrate the peripheral significance of text in our
constitutional tradition and of amendments in the dynamics of constitutional change.
But if we widen our angle of vision, we might view mobilization of
women for constitutional change as the source of the new understanding that informed judicial interpretation of the Constitution in the
1970s. During the decade leading up to the Court's declaration that
sex-based state action would be subject to heightened scrutiny under
the Equal Protection Clause, groups coalesced around the goals of
supporting or defeating the ERA and making claims about the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Speaking from a variety of social locations, Americans made
claims about the Constitution that diverged from the ways that judges
enforced its terms in the courts. These included claims about amending the Constitution (the ERA strategy), 4 as well as claims about interpreting the Constitution (the Fourteenth Amendment strategy).25
23
24

Id. at 1478 (footnotes omitted).
The ERA was first introduced in 1923 by the National Women's Party (NWP);

NWP lobbying ensured that the ERA was introduced in Congress every year thereafter
and included in every Democratic and Republican platform beginning in 1944. MARY
FRANCES BERRY, WHY ERA FAILED: POLITICS, WOMEN'S RIGHTS, AND THE AMENDING
PROCESS OF THE CONSTITUTION 44, 57 (1986);Jo FREEMAN, THE POLITICS OF WOMEN'S
LIBERATION 63-64 (1975). For decades, women activists were divided about the advis-

ability of the ERA, because the Amendment was thought to imperil protective labor
legislation for women, but these concerns dissipated by the late 1960s. Women's
groups persuaded Congress to include a prohibition against sex discrimination in Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and then organized to secure its enforcement by the
EEOC; soon thereafter judicial invalidation of protective labor legislation under Tide
VII made labor organizations' earlier opposition to the ERA moot. JANE J. MANSBRIDGE, WHY WE LOST THE ERA 10 (1986); see also FREEMAN, supra, at 80-81 (observing
that by 1969, the United Auto Workers had reversed their earlier opposition to the
ERA).
25 Beginning in the mid-1960s, feminist litigators were also beginning to invoke
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Claims about interpretation and amendment were initially advanced
separately, and then often in tandem, 26 by strategies that involved organizing outside the party system as well as in it; practices of litigation,
lobbying, and legislation; techniques of mass mobilization and protest;
2
and strategies of communication through the visual and print mediaY.
By 1970, protests in support of the ERA had become widespread
and visible in the media. As Susan Hartmann recounts:
[I]n August 1970... [o]n the fiftieth anniversary of women's suffrage,
thousands of feminists of all persuasions responded to NOW's call for a
Women's Strike for Equality. They marched, picketed, and held rallies
across the country in the largest mass action for women's rights in the
nation's history and the first demonstration of the new movement to receive serious and substantial press coverage. s

Protests escalated as ERA advocates sought to bring pressure to bear
on Congress to enact the Amendment, and then to promote its ratification in statehouses across the nation.' There was energetic opposithe Fourteenth Amendment as a constitutional ground for protecting women's rights.
See SUSAN M. HARTMANN, THE OTHER FEMINISTS: ACTIvISTS IN THE LIBERAL EsTABLISHMENT 60-91 (1998) (describing the early litigation campaigns of the ACLU
Women's Rights Project); Serena Mayeri, "A Common Fate of Discrimination": RaceGender Analogies in Legal and Historical Perspective, 110 YALE LJ. 1045, 1069-79 (2001)
(discussing Fourteenth Amendment litigation strategies from the mid-1960s to the
mid-1970s).
26 See Serena Mayeri, "We Differ Not So Much
in Our Objectives As in Our Strategy": Pauli Murray and the Triumph of Strategic Feminist Constitutionalism, 19601972, at 21-28 (2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (discussing debates around the movement's interpretive and amendatory claims, and the strategic
advantages and disadvantages in advancing them together).
27 Supra notes 24, 25; infra note 29 and accompanying
text.
28

SUSAN HARTMANN,

FROM MARGIN TO MAINSTREAM:

AMERICAN WOMEN AND

POLITICS SINCE 1960, at 66 (1989).
29) As
part of the 1970 protests, the Pittsburgh chapter of NOW
organized a protest
that disrupted Senator Birch Bayh's hearings on the constitutional amendment for the
eighteen-year-old vote. Bayh promised hearings on the ERA that began the next
spring. FREEMAN, supra note 24, at 213; MANSBRIDGE, supra note 24, at 10-11. ERA
supporters "generated millions of letters urging legislators to vote for the ERA. Fifteen
hundred letters a month flooded some congressional offices." HARTMANN, supra note
28, at 105-06. After Congress approved the ERA on March 22, 1972, ERA supporters
staged protests in a variety of states to promote the ratification of the Amendment. In
1972, ERA supporters in Virginia were arrested for disorderly conduct following the
defeat of the Amendment in a House committee. BERRY, supra note 24, at 65-66. That
same year, a California state senator who stalled the ERA in a committee faced constant demonstrations and interruptions at his public appearances until the Amendment made it out of the committee. Id. at 66.
In this period, groups supporting the Amendment included: "a united AFL-CIO,
the National Organization for Women, the National Federation of Business and Pro-
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tion to the ERA in Congress and in the nation in the period just before and after the Amendment's passage.3 0 But it was not until 1973,
in the wake of the Court's decision in Roe v. Wade,1 that longtime Republican activist 2 Phyllis Schlafly began a serious organizing drive
against the ERA.3

fessional Women's Clubs, the General Federation of Women's Clubs, and Presbyterian,
Baptist, Methodist, and Jewish federations." GILBERT Y. STEINER, CONSTITUTIONAL
INEQUALITY: THE POLITICAL FORTUNES OF THE EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT 46-47
(1985). Groups involved in ERAmerica, "a national alliance of over two hundred associations that supported [the] ERA, included the American Bar Association, the Girl
Scouts, and the National Council of Senior Citizens." Id. at 47.
By early 1973, thirty states had ratified the Amendment with little legislative debate. MANSBRIDGE, supra note 24, at 12-13.
30 Senator Samuel James Ervin,Jr., Democrat of
North Carolina, led opposition to
the ERA in the Senate. He defended traditionalist views of womanhood, claiming that
the ERA was a "declaration of war on homemakers," would leave women unprotected
in the workplace and would lead to such horrible results as integrated restrooms and
women serving in combat. DONALD G. MATHEWS & JANE SHERRON DE HART, SEX,
GENDER, AND THE POLITICS OF ERA: A STATE AND THE NATION 47-50 (1990).
At hearings on the ERA before the Judiciary Subcommittee, two scheduled witnesses testified against the ERA: Senator Ervin and a member of the National Council
of Catholic Women. A surprise witness, testifying on behalf of the Justice Department,
was William Rehnquist. Rehnquist began by affirming that "President Nixon and the
Administration support the goal of establishing equal rights for women," before reading a twenty-nine page statement arguing against the need for a constitutional
amendment. Rehnquist claimed that federal courts would further extend Fourteenth
Amendment protection to women, and a constitutional amendment would sow confusion in this newly devleoping body of law. HUGH DAVIS GRAHAM, THE CIVIL RIGHTS
ERA: ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL POLICY 1960-1972, at 416-17 (1990); see
also BERRY, supra note 24, at 65 (noting that when the ERA was passed by Congress in
1972, the party that nominated George Wallace for president in 1968 denounced the
ERA as a "socialistic plan to destroy the home," while the politically conservative Happiness of Womanhood (HOW) group "insisted ERA would legitimate homosexuality
and permit homosexuals to marry and even to adopt children").
Legal scholars also opposed the ERA. Paul Freund authored a statement against
the ERA endorsed by forty-three lawyers and law school deans. Freund argued that the
ERA would mandate an absolute standard of constitutional equality when in reality, he
argued, women needed protection in a variety of social roles and settings. MATHEWS &
DE HART, supra, at 30.
31 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
'32 After Congress passed the ERA in 1972 and Senator
Ervin lost his Senate seat in
1974, Ervin teamed up with Phyllis Schlafly to oppose the ERA in the states. MATHEWS
& DE HART, supra note 30, at 50. Schlafly began a national "Stop ERA" campaign in
1973 that benefited from conservative evangelical and fundamentalist concern over
the Supreme Court's decision in Roe v. Wade. BERRY, supra note 24, at 88-89. The New
Right coalition that formed after 1973 included not only Republican stalwarts such as
the American Party and the John Birch Society but also newly energized conservative
religious groups, such as the National Council of Catholic Women and, later, Concerned Women for America. BERRY, supra note 24, at 65-66; FREEMAN, supra note 24, at
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Mobilization and countermobilization of groups that defined
themselves around questions of constitutional reform changed the social and political landscape within which courts interpreted the Constitution. Lawmaking that satisfied the criteria of Article V never occurred, yet, over time, judges interpreting the Constitution in the
midst of such social movement practices began to incorporate alternative understandings into their account of the Constitution.
Frontiero v. Richardson3 acknowledges that constitutional interpretation is taking place amidst such tumult. In the course of making the
case for applying strict scrutiny to sex-based state action under the
Equal Protection Clause, Justice Brennan's plurality opinion points to
Congress's recent enactment of the ERA and employment discrimina34
tion statutes recognizing women's rights, while Justice Powell's concurring opinion argues against adopting the strict scrutiny framework
on the grounds that the nation was in the midst of considering
whether to ratify the ERA.35 Notwithstanding these reservations, three

217, 220; MANSBRIDGE, supra note 24, at 16, 143-48, 173-77. Traditional, often religious, persons saw ERA advocates as abortion supporters who "reject[ed] the notion
that motherhood was a truly important task and endors[ed] sexual hedonism instead
of moral restraint." MANSBRIDGE, supra note 24, at 13. The December 1974 headline
in Schlafly's newsletter, "ERA Means Abortion and Population Shrinkage," connected
these concerns. Id. at 223 n.28; see a/soJane De Hart-Mathews & Donald Mathews, The
Cultural Politics of the ERA's Defeat, in RIGHTS OF PASSAGE: THE PAST AND FUTURE OF
THE ERA 44, 48-51 (Joan Hoff-Wilson ed., 1986) (discussing anxieties about the ERA
undermining "traditional" womanhood and blurring the roles of men and women in
areas such as the military, sex crimes, abortion, integrated restrooms, homosexuality,
and the family). This explosive coalition, combined with lackluster state organizations
of ERA supporters, brought the ratification of the ERA to a near-halt. A few states rescinded their prior ratification, and only three states ratified the ERA in 1974, one
state in 1975, and one state in 1977, for a total of thirty-five states. MANSBRIDGE, supra
note 24, at 13. No states ratified the Amendment after 1977, even though Congress
extended the original ratification deadline from 1979 to 1982. Id.
33 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
For Strauss's account of the Supreme Court's deliberations in Frontiero,see Strauss, Irrelvance,supra note 1, at 1477.
34 Frontiero,411 U.S.
at 687.
35 Justice Powell believed the Court should exercise restraint
in the ways it interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment while the Nation debated the ERA:
The Equal Rights Amendment, which if adopted will resolve the substance of
this precise question, has been approved by the Congress and submitted for
ratification by the States. If this Amendment is duly adopted, it will represent
the will of the people accomplished in the manner prescribed by the Constitution. By acting prematurely and unnecessarily, as I view it, the Court has assumed a decisional responsibility at the very time when state legislatures, functioning within the traditional democractic process, are debating the proposed
Amendment. It seems to me that this reaching out to pre-empt by judicial action a major political decision which is currently in process of resolution does
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years later, in the midst of the ratification debate, and with opposition
to the Amendment beginning seriously to mobilize," a majority of the
Court voted to adopt an intermediate scrutiny framework for sex dis3
crimination claims under the Fourteenth Amendment.
In adopting a new framework for reviewing sex discrimination
claims under the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court was intervening
in a wide-ranging controversy and responding to social movement activism in matters of women's rights, much as it developed modem
race equality doctrine in the midst of impassioned national conflicts
about segregation, and in response to the litigation, organizing, and
protest activities of African Americans.38 Claims on the text of the

not reflect appropriate respect for duly prescribed legislative processes.
Id. at 692 (Powell, J., concurring).
See supra note 32 and accompanying text (discussing mounting opposition to
the ERA by a number of political and religious groups).
37 See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197-99
(1976) ("[C]lassifications by gender
must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to
achievement of those objectives.").
For one account of the ways that the litigation efforts of the NAACP shaped
modern equal protection doctrine, see RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE:
TiHE
HISTORY OF BIOWN V. BoARDi OF EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR
EQUALITY 545-81 (1976). See also ADAM FAIRCLOUGH, BETTER DAY COMING: BLACKS
AND EQUALITY, 1890-2000, at 82, 197-200, 218-19 (2001) (locating the NAACP's litigation campaign in a larger social movement history). Randall Kennedy has described
how social movement protests orchestrated by Martin Luther King, Jr., shaped civil
rights law of the Second Reconstruction:
King's activities placed him at or near the center of controversies that dramatically altered the nation's legal landscape. From the Montgomery Bus
Boycott arose Gayle v. Browder, the Supreme Court decision that invalidated de
jure segregation in intrastate transportation and thereby effectively overruled
Plessy v. Fergfuson. Protest campaigns in Birmingham and Selma constituted
crucial links in the chain of events that culminated in the Civil Rights Act of
1964, the Voting Rights Act of 1965, and the Supreme Court decisions upholding these legislative initiatives.
These and related campaigns also gave rise to cases that significantly affected legal doctrines regulating freedom of expression.... The Civil Rights
Movement ... stag[ed] protest activities that forced courts to create or refine
doctrine involving a wide array of First Amendment concerns, including symbolic speech, the public forum, freedom of association, libel, and rules governing mass demonstrations.... The result was not only a beneficial transformation in the substantive law of race relations, but also a blossoming of
libertarian themes in First Amendment jurisprudence.

Randall Kennedy, Martin Luther King's Constitution: A Legal History of the Montgomery Bus
Boycott, 98 YALE L.J. 999, 1000-01 (1989) (footnotes omitted). For an analysis of how
the lunch counter sit-ins helped shape Warren Court case law concerning state action
and congressional power under the Commerce Clause and Reconstruction Amendments, see Post & Siegel, supra note 13, at 486-502. See also id. at 51.3-22 (discussing the

2001]

TEXT IN CONTEST

Constitution made by mobilized groups of Americans outside.. the
courthouse helped bring into being the understandings that judges
then read into the text of the Constitution. This process of constitutionaijurisgenesis may not conform to the particulars of Article V, but
neither is it adequately represented by the model of common law adjudication that Strauss invokes.
Strauss notes that constitutional lawmaking is proceeding in the
midst of the ERA debate, but in an effort to defend the Burger Court
from the charge of "activist" lawmaking, he takes pains to emphasize
the immateriality of the failed ratification debate to the development
of modem sex discrimination jurisprudence. 3 Neither the "substantial support" for the ERA, nor opposition to it, is determinative on his
account. 40 Instead, Strauss depicts judicial interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment as a response to "insistent pressure from society as
a whole" that "took the form of the increasing presence of women in
the workplace, in politics, and in other new roles." 41 On his account,
it was these changes in social structure that compelled the Court to
change the way it was interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment and
thatjustified the course the Court took.
Strauss's interest in defending the Court from the charge that it
interpreted the Constitution in contravention of Article V may incline
him to discount the role that popular debate about the Constitution
played in the rise of sex discrimination jurisprudence. If Strauss defends the Burger Court from the charge that it acted in contravention
of Article V, however, his deeper interest in the case of the ERA is to
demonstrate the immateriality of Article V itself. As Strauss sees it,
neither Article V nor the Constitution's text plays an important role in
the dynamics of constitutional change in a "mature democratic society., 42 As Strauss states his case:
When a regime is being established, formal texts are more important;
the traditions, institutions, and understandings that bind a mature society together, and that make orderly change possible without formal
amendments, are less well developed. But once a constitutional system
has survived for, say, a generation or two, formal constitutional amendments of the kind Article V envisions become incidental to the main

democratic roots of modern sex and race equality jurisprudence).
39 Strauss, Irrelevance,supra note 1, at 1476-78.
40 Id. at 1477.
41 Id. at 1478; see also supra text accompanying note 21 (quoting Strauss
in full).
42 Id. at 1460.

314

UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 150: 297

processes of constitutional change.43

Strauss emphasizes that this claim is an extension of his argument that
"the entire text of the Constitution (including the amendments) plays
a limited role in the
development of constitutional law in a mature
44
democratic society.,
By contrast, as I understand the rise of sex discrimination jurisprudence, both Article V and the text of the Constitution itself played
an important role in the dynamics of constitutional change. Where
Strauss sees judges interpreting precedent and tradition in light of
"developments in society," I see this and more: judges interpreting
the Constitution in the midst of a popular debate about the Constitution. Americans on both sides of the courthouse door are making
claims about the Constitution. Outside the courthouse, the Constitution's text plays a significant role in eliciting and focusing normative
disputes among Americans about women's rights under the Constitution-a dynamic that serves to communicate these newly crystallizing
understandings and expectations about women's rights to judges interpreting the Constitution inside the courthouse door. Such communication occurs whether or not the activities in question satisfy Article V's rule of recognition for constitutional lawmaking.
These communications between citizenry and judiciary may not
amount to Article V lawmaking, but they are nonetheless a regular
and easily recognizable feature of our constitutional culture. In our
constitutional culture, a variety of understandings and practices empower nonjuridical actors to challenge the way judges have interpreted the Constitution. Many of these understandings and activities
focus on the Constitution's text.
Consider some of the understandings anchored by the Constitution's text. The terms of the constitutional compact are set forth in a
writing, authored by "We the People." The Constitution's text proclaims the sovereignty of the People and has thus come to symbolize
the Constitution's democratic authorship. The concept of the Constitution as text supports several interlocking understandings of authority in our constitutional tradition. Setting forth the terms of the constitutional compact in a writing signifies a commitment to
transparency in government. The terms of government are to be
open, accessible, contestable, and revisable. A constitutional order
43 Id. at
44 Id.

1460-61 (footnotes omitted).
at 1461 n.8.
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organized on such terms allows for ongoing public authorship. It is as
a document that the Constitution belongs to the polity and not merely
45
The Constituto professionals, to the People and not to the state.
understandthe
anchoring
in
role
important
an
plays
thus
text
tion's
the ways
contest
to
actors
nonjuridical
allow
that
ings and practices
judges interpret the Constitution.
S 46
This cluster of symbolic meanings is to Strauss little more than
practice.
constitutional
our
describe
that: a mythology that does not
In a developed constitutional order, it is judges who make constitutional law by reasoning about social developments in light of constitutional precedent and traditions, and, Strauss concludes, judges do so
rather well.47
But as the exchange over modern sex discrimination law illustrates, Strauss's "realism" about our constitutional tradition represents
at best a highly stylized account of our constitutional development, in
which judges have both the capacity and the inclination to divine
changes in social norms as they evolve over time. Where Strauss sees
judges reinterpreting precedent and tradition in light of "developments in society," 4 I see, amidst those "developments in society," citizens challenging the ways judges have interpreted the Constitution
and engaged in conflict with each other about the meaning of the
Constitution. Judges interpreting the Constitution are not simply responding to developments in society; they are responding to claims
about the Constitution and intervening in ongoing social disputes
about its meaning.
In times of constitutional mobilization, then,judges do not merely
translate otherwise mute "social developments" into legality; rather,
actors outside the courts are engaging in creative acts of constitutional
interpretation, and judges interpret the Constitution while listening to
the many social actors who are speaking about the Constitution's

45 See PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE:

26
(1982) (discussing Justice Hugo Black's understanding of the Constitution).
46 See, e.g., Strauss, Common Law, supra note 3, at 879 ("[l1t is the common law approach, not the approach that connects law to an authoritative text, or an authoritative
decision by the Framers or by 'we the people,' that best explains, and best justifies,
American constitutional law today.").
47 See id. at 934 ("When we apotheosize the Framers we understate the importance
of the many subsequent generations of lawyers and judges, and nonlawyers and nonjudges, who have helped develop the principles of American constitutional law.").
48 Strauss, Irrelevance, supra note 1, at 1478, quoted in supra text accompanying note
THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION
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meaning.
II.

INTERLUDE: REFLECTIONS ON THE LAW-SOCIETY RELATIONSHIP

These two different stories about the rise of sex discrimination jurisprudence conceptualize the dynamics of legal change and the relation of law and society in quite different terms.
When Strauss discusses where constitutional law originates or how
it exerts force, he focuses on the lawmaking activities of legal officials,
imagined from a standpoint internal to the legal system. 4' Judges
make laws by consulting authoritative legal sources, yet they must do
so in ways that are responsive to social developments if they expect to
be able to enforce law. Law and society are thus sharply differentiated, yet tightly correlated. Law is a tool for regulating conduct50 that
works only when it is adapted to the norms of the society it would
regulate:5 As Strauss models change, there is a high degree of norma-

This is the standpoint from which Strauss makes his case about
the irrelevance
of the ERA. It is also the standpoint from which Strauss defends his claim that the Civil
War Amendments "can be plausibly characterized as limited and incidental." Strauss,
Irrelevance,supra note 1, at 1486. To substantiate this claim, Strauss discusses the ways
state actors implemented the terms of the Civil War Amendments, barely acknowledging the conflicting understandings and expectations to which the amendments gave
rise. Thus, he asserts that "[t] he practical effect of the Thirteenth Amendment was, at
most, to abolish slavery only in the four border states ... that had not joined the Confederacy." Id. at 1480. Similarly, he asserts that "[t]he Constitution, in practice, did
not change with the [Fifteenth] Amendment. It changed only when deeper changes
occurred in society." Id. at 1483. Here, as in his account of the rise of sex discrimination jurisprudence, Strauss understands the dynamics of constitutional change
through the lawmaking and law-enforcing activities of legal officials, and barely attends
to the ways that citizens make competing claims about constitutional meaning. Cf id.
at 1484-85 ("Still.... it might be said, when the civil rights revolution ... did occur, it
was important that the Fourteenth Amendment supplied a textual promise of equality
to which advocates, and ultimately the Supreme Court, could point. But even this limited effect cannot be attributed to the Fourteenth Amendment without qualification."). Because Strauss analyzes law through the activities of legal officials, he does
not attend to the claims that social movements make on the Constitution through litigation, lobbying, organizing, and protest, much less treat such claims as playing an important role in the dynamics of constitutional change.
50 Infra text accompanying
note 74.
51 This understanding of the law-society relationship recurs
throughout Strauss's
argument. For example:
[F]or an amendment to matter, it must be unusually difficult to evade. An
amendment that specifies a precise rule, for example, is more likely to have an
effect than one that establishes only a relatively vague norm. If its text is at all
imprecise, an amendment that is adopted at the high-water mark of public
sentiment will be prone to narrow construction or outright evasion once pub49

2001]

72EXT IN CONTEST

tive coherence within law and society, as well as between them.
Contrast Strauss's account, which imagines law and society as differentiated and instrumentally related systems, to another model of
the law-society relationship, which recognizes that law is a network of
institutions that can issue directives backed by sanctions, but also understands that law exerts authority as a system of meanings. Considered from this standpoint, the boundaries between law and society are
Through pathways of
considerably more difficult to demarcate:
meaning, law can structure social life, even when there are no legal
officials present to enforce the law.54 And it is through pathways of

lic sentiment recedes, as the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments were.
Strauss, Irrelevance,supra note 1, at 1486.
52 See id. at 1503 ("Sometimes amendments ratify a permanent shift in the political
culture; sometimes they do not.... But in either event, what controls the pace of
change is the culture, not the amendment."); see also id. at 1478 ("What 'ratified' the
ERA, in effect, was the same kind of thing that ratified the Child Labor Amendment:
insistent pressure from society as a whole."); id. at 1479 ("But it was not the [Civil War]
amendments that changed things. The amendments made relatively little difference
when they were adopted; the changes they prescribed came about only when society
itself changed.").
511In this context, it may be helpful to consider the distinction that Austin Sarat
and Thomas R. Kearns draw between "instrumental" and "constitutive" perspectives on
the law-and-society relationship. Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns, Beyond the Great Divide: Forms of Legal Scholarship and Everyday Life, in LAW IN EVERYDAY LIFE 21 (Austin
Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1993). While instrumentalism "conceives of law as
largely external to the social practices it regulates," the constitutive conception of law
detects its effects "in meanings and self-understandings rather than in the results of
sanctions." Id. at 27.
[T]hose who adopt the constitutive perspective believe that law permeates social life and that its influence is not adequately grasped when law is treated as
an external, normative missile launched at independent, ongoing activities.... We are not, as instrumentalists suggest, merely pushed and pulled by
laws that impinge on us from the outside. Rather, we have internalized law's
meanings and its representations of us, so much so that our own purposes and
understandings can no longer be extricated from them.
Id. at 29. 1 join Sarat and Kearns in emphasizing that law exerts authority through
pathways of meaning, but understand law as having significant institutional embodiment that the "constitutive" perspective may obscure. Cf Austin D. Sarat, Redirecting
Legal Scholarship in Law Schools, 12 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 129, 134 (2000) (reviewing
PAUL KAHN, THE CULTURAL STUDY OF LAW: RECONSTRUCTING LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP
(1999)) ("The constitutive perspective contends that social life is run through with law,
so much that the relevant category for the scholar is not the external one of causality.., but the internal one of meaning.").
54 See, for example, PATRICIA EwICK & SUSAN S. SILBEY, THE
COMMON PLACE OF
LAW: STORIES FROM EVERYDAY LIFE 45 (1998), stating:
Every time a person interprets some event in terms of legal concepts or terminology-whether to applaud or to criticize, whether to appropriate or to re-
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meaning that all manner of social actors can shape law, even when
no formal act of lawmaking transpires.
If we attend to these pathways of meaning, we will reason about
many aspects of the law/society relationship differently, including the
ways law changes. To determine how law changes, we might simply
consult the legal system's official self-accountings and examine the
conduct of those formally authorized to interpret and to enforce law;
but the account this inquiry will generate is partial at best. We can
supplement it by looking beyond the legal system's own account of
lawmaking to legal culture-the network of understandings and practices in which a society's legal institutions are embedded. The understandings and practices that support a society's legal institutions are
dispersed, involving a wide range of social actors in a wide range of
contexts. Such understandings and practices may not be "law" or
"lawmaking" according to the legal system's own formal criteria, but
they play a regular part in the operations of the legal system, and so
should be considered if we want to understand how law functions. By
legal culture, then, I refer to those understandings and practices that
give shape to a society's legal system, including but not limited to the
formal procedures it designates as lawmaking.
sist-legality is produced. The production may include innovations as well as
faithful replication. Either way, repreated invocation of the law sustains its
capacity to comprise social relations.
See also, e.g., Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REv. 57, 102-25
(1984) (illustrating how law and society are mutually constitutive); Reva B. Siegel, In
the Eyes of the Law: Reflections on the Authority of Legal Discourse, in LAW'S STORIES:
NARRATIVE AND RHETORIC IN THE LAw 225, 231 (Peter Brooks & Paul Gewirtz eds.,
1996) [hereinafter LAW'S STORIES] (arguing that law's role in shaping social understanding is far greater than the concept of "legal fictions" suggests).
55 Austin Sarat
observes:
[L]egal meanings are not simply invented and communicated in an unidirectional process.... Litigants, clients, and others bring their own understandings to bear; they deploy and use meanings strategically to advance interests
and goals. The), press their understandings in and on law and, in so doing,
invite adaptation and change in the practices ofjudges, lawyers, and other legal officials.
Sarat, supra note 53, at 139.
56The legal system has criteria for determining what law is
and when law changes.
These criteria for recognizing "law" or "lawmaking" are generally developed for the
purpose of regulating disputes about when judges (or other officers of the law) have
authority to compel citizens, or other legal institutions, to act. But with a different set
of purposes in view, one might give a different account of how and why law changes.
This positive account might bear on questions that arise within the operations of the
legal system, or outside of it. For present purposes, then, I defer the question of
whether this account of legal culture is part of an "internal" or "external" understand-
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Strauss discounts the participation of nonjuridical actors in the
rise of sex discrimination jurisprudence because their participation
did not amount to lawmaking in the Article V sense. But if the social
movement activities we have considered did not satisfy Article V criteria for constitutional lawmaking, these activities set up pathways of
communication between the citizenry and judiciary that drew upon
understandings and practices that are an entrenched feature of our
constitutional culture.
To appreciate how our constitutional culture provides for such
dialogue-even when it does not satisfy the legal system's official criteria for lawmaking-we can take a step back from the ways constitutional jurisprudence models the relations between citizenry and judiciary and describe that relationship from a different vantage point.
This account will not assume that judges have authority to decide the
meaning of the Constitution; rather, it will examine the understandings and practices that sustain the authority of officials to make and
enforce law. Differently put, I am interested in exploring what we observe about the operations of the legal system when we don't assume
that law is authoritative, but instead examine the understandings and
practices that make law authoritative. These understandings and
practices are integral parts of our constitutional culture, and as such,
evolve in history;57 I invoke them here in broad outline only, for pur-

ing of the legal system. To this extent, I distinguish my discussion of legal culture from
the work of Paul Kahn, who argues that we can apprehend a society's legal culture only
be assuming a "non-participant" or external perspective on its legal system:
[T]he scholar of law's rule should not be asked whether law is the expression
of the will of the popular sovereign and thus a form of self-government.
These are propositions internal to the systems of belief. A scholarly discipline
of the cultural form approaches these propositions not from the perspective
of their validity, but from the perspective of the meaning they have for the individual within the community of belief.
PAUL KAHN, THE CULTURAL STUDY OF LAw: RECONSTRUCTING LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP 2-3
(1999).
57 For example, Article V has existed as a lawmaking mechanism since ratification
of the Constitution, but the frequency with which the nation has adopted amendments
to the Constitution has varied considerably over its history. No amendments were ratified in the more than half-century between ratification of the Twelfth Amendment in
1804 and ratification of the Reconstruction amendments, with all their attendant procedural irregularities, in the aftermath of the Civil War. 2 ACKERMAN, supra note 11, at
99-119. Nearly another half-century passed until the nation ratified the Sixteenth
Amendment in 1913, at the dawn of a stormy period of Progressive Era lawmaking.
Four amendments, dealing with income tax, direct election of senators, temperance,
and woman suffrage, were ratified between 1913 and 1920, eliciting a storm of complaints that the Constitution was being amended too frequently, which culminated in
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poses of considering their relevance to constitutional theory.
What gives a judge authority to pronounce the Constitution's
meaning? Consider some possibilities. Officials may hold authority
through relations of fear, because members of a legal culture understand the sanctions that officials will inflict for disobedience. Officials
can also hold authority through claims of right, because members of a
legal culture believe that officials are entitled to exercise the power
they have. The beliefs that confer authority on officials who make or
enforce law may consist in little more than role recognition, coupled
with a habit of deference to the judgment of "experts" about the content of the law. Or convictions about legitimacy may involve citizens
more actively in making judgments about the laws officials are enforcing.
Democratic culture invites citizens to assume this more active role
in forming judgments about the law. In this society, citizens are invited to form judgments, not only about the law made by their elected
representatives, but also, as I have observed, about the Constitution
itself. While the authority of the Constitution is sustained in part
through practices of veneration and deference, it is also sustained
through a very different kind of relationship, in which citizens know
themselves as authorities, as authors of the law.
As we consider the range of understandings about authority in
American constitutional culture, we can see that some conceptions of
authority consolidate the power of officials in the legal system to declare the Constitution's meaning, while others enable challenges to
such pronouncements.)s Given the mix of passive and active roles citizens assume in matters concerning the Constitution's meaning, some
features of our constitutional culture work to legitimate institutions,
while others work to support challenges to hegemonic understandings

the defeat of the child labor amendment and the campaign to repeal prohibition.
DAVID E. KYviG, EXPLICIT AND AUTHENTIC AcTs: AMENDING THE U.S. CONSTITUTION,

1776-1995, at 193-267 (1996). Arguably, Article V has not played the same role in negotiating culturally "hot" controversies since that time. Along similar lines, the Senate's advice and consent role in the appointment of Article Ill judges has its own history (in which Robert Bork occupies a special role), as do organized litigation
strategies and social movement practices of protest and civil disobedience.
Sandy Levinson calls these attitudes, respectively, Catholic and Protestant. See
LEVINSON, supra note 9, at 29 ("As to the ultimate authority to interpret the source of
doctrine, the protestant position is based on the legitimacy of individualized (or at
least nonhierarchical communal) interpretation .... while the catholic position is that
the Supreme Court is the dispenser of ultimate interpretation .... ).
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"
Is the
and arrangements, enabling resistance in the name of right.5
employment relationship free contract or wage slavery? Are citizens
subject to government, or is government subject to citizens? Beliefs
about the Constitution's democratic authorship authorize and empower citizens to make claims about the Constitution's meaning that
diverge from the ways judges have interpreted it. The text of the Constitution thus elicits and channels dispute about the forms of freedom
and unfreedom in American life.
Christopher Tomlins has emphasized that legal culture supports a
plurality of understandings about right action, enabling the articulation of alternatives to officially recognized understandings:

Legal culture must be considered to encompass not only the discourse
and practices of what is officially the law/legal system, or the discourse
and practices that are responses to or invocations of that law/legal system, but also discourse and practices that represent other and very different constructions of what right action might look like. Understood in
this way, legal culture represents a range of competing possibilities, a
manifestation of the plurality of authorized behaviors and authorizing
discourses existing in society at any one time, and of the relationships,
complementary or antagonistic, among them.

59 See, e.g, Hartog, supra note 9, at 1016-17 ("An
American emancipatory tradition
of constitutional meaning must be rooted in the subversive and disruptive and utopian
messages that people read into constitutional texts and drew from diverse and contradictory sources ....); see also id. at 1022 (discussing the ways that, in the United States,

subordinated groups "have read into the Constitution an implied destabilization of
those vested-and often constitutionally recognized-rights of others that constrained
their capacities and their autonomy"). A number of critical race theorists have emphasized the power of rights discourse to support counter-hegemonic understandings of
PATRICIAJ. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 164
social relations. See, e.g.,
(1991) ("'Rights feel new in the mouths of most black people ....It is the magic word
of visibility and invisibility, of inclusion and exclusion, of power and no power. The

concept of rights, both positive and negative, is the marker of our citizenship, our relation to others."); Mari J.Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: CriticalLegal Studies and Repara-

tions, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323, 333 (1987) ("The dissonance of combining deep
criticism of law with an aspirational vision of law is part of the experience of people of
color."); Pope, supra note 14, at 953 ("Rights claims now play a vital role in the 'cognitive liberation' of social movements from fatalism."); cf.Alan Hunt, Rights and Social
Movements: Counter-Hegemonic Strategies, 17 J.L. Soc'Y 309, 313 (1990) ("[C]ounterhegemony.., has to start from that which exists, which involves starting from 'where
people are at.' Such a conception of counter-hegemony requires the 'reworking' or

'refashioning' of the elements which are constitutive of the prevailing hegemony.").

60 Christopher Tomlins, Subordination,Authority, Law: Subjects in Labor History,
47
INT'L LAB. & WORKING-CLASS HIST. 56, 66-67 (1995). James Pope draws on Robert
Cover's theory ofjurisgenesis to explore the ways social movements can participate in
making constitutional meaning.
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In this society, mobilized groups of citizens understand themselves
as authorized to speak to matters involving "what is officially the
law/legal system" where the Constitution is concerned, in a way that
they do not feel authorized to speak about questions of tort or property law. Of course, at any point in time, those subject to the common
law may resist, evade, and contest its terms, but understandings about
the authorship of the Constitution empower citizens to voice objections to official declarations of constitutional law in special ways.
When mobilized groups of citizens make interpretive or amendatory claims on the text of the Constitution, they do so with the understanding that they are authorized to do so and with the expectation
that law might in fact change by reason of their claims. This expectation that law is semantically permeable distinguishes ways people respond to "official" declarations about the meaning of the Constitution
and the common law. Of course, authority to speak about matters
concerning the Constitution is not distributed equally throughout society, nor do individuals or groups experience it consistently. But the
understanding that the Constitution is the People's gives rise to a distinct, and historically evolving, set of attitudes and practices that provoke, sustain, and support popular engagement with constitutional
law. These historically evolving attitudes and practices in turn play an
important role in shaping official declarations about the Constitution's meaning.
Because our constitutional culture addresses ordinary citizens as
authors and imbues them with the expectation that official declarations of the law are semantically permeable, contestable, and revisable, official pronouncements about the meaning of the Constitution
elicit special forms of engagement from citizens and so become a focal
point of normative contestation.
Beliefs about the Constitution's authority as law shape the discursive structure of such conflicts. Ordinary citizens believe that they are
entitled to make claims about the meaning of the Constitution, while
at the same time they view the Constitution as a form of paramount
Robert Cover's concept of jurisgenesis, the creation of legal meaning, provides the foundation for a theory about the role of legal thought and practice
in sustaining resistance, and thus for an ideal type of constitutional insurgency
that proceeds from localities to the center. .. . [U]nlike the traditional concept of jurisprudence, which envisions legal thought as a science ... ,jurisgenesis is a cultural process that occurs in a wide range of social settings, many
of them outside official legal institutions.
Pope, supra note 14, at 954 (footnote omitted).
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law that supervenes ordinary expressions of political will. Thus, it is
not by proclaiming the semantic indeterminacy of the Constitution
that citizens make claims-to courts or each other-about the Constitution's meaning, but something like the contrary. Citizens invoke
the text of the Constitution, properly interpreted or amended in light
of our constitutional traditions, as a foundation, having meaning that
can be ascertained apart from the pronouncements of those authorized to interpret it or the preferences of those who live under it.
Sometimes citizen claims are interpretive and take the form of an
assertion about what the Constitution does say; sometimes these
claims are amendatory and take the form of an assertion about what
the Constitution ought to say. During periods of social movement
mobilization, interpretive and amendatory claims are often advanced
in tandem, 6' and there are certain deep linkages between them. Citizens advancing amendatory claims appeal to the understandings constituting our constitutional tradition to challenge "official" declarations about the Constitution's meaning, and as they do so,
amendatory claims may converge with interpretive claims in semantic
structure. 2

61

During the nineteenth century and the twentieth century, the women's move-

ment has gone through periods in which it forged new constitutional understandings
by advancing interpretive and amendatory claims on the Constitution simultaneously.
See supra text accompanying notes 26-27 (discussing Fourteenth Amendment and ERA
claims); infra text accompanying notes 89-92 (discussing Fourteenth Amendment and
suffrage amendment claims).
62 Although there are few formal restrictions on the exercise of the Article V
amending power, longstanding traditions of argument in our constitutional culture
seem to channel debates about whether to exercise Article V power into debates about
whether the proposed amendment comports with understandings constituting our
constitutional tradition. One could argue for or against an amendment by insisting
that it is important to change our constitutional tradition, but habits of appealing to the
Constitution as a form of foundational law seem to undermine the persuasive force of
such an appeal. Advocates advancing arguments for constitutional lawmaking often
make their case by appeal to foundational understandings of the Constitution, just as
their opponents will appeal to foundational understandings of the Constitution to oppose them-sometimes even arguing that certain exercises of the Article V power are
unconstitutional. See, e.g., CLEMENT E. VOSE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE: AMENDMENT
POLITICS AND SUPREME COURT LITIGATION SINCE 1900, at 39-63 (1972) (discussing law
review articles and litigation during the Progressive Era that advanced the claim that
the Fifteenth and Nineteenth Amendments were unconstitutional).
Just as some traditions of argument about constitutional amendment resemble
forms of constitutional interpretation, there are forms of constitututional interpretation that diverge so far from prevailing understandings of the Constitution that they
have affinities to amendatory claims. See Lobel, supra note 14, at 1331-33 (discussing
aspirational social movement litigation that proposes alternative constitutional under-
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Citizens advancing claims about the Constitution's meaning address legal authorities and each other, often speaking in groups. The
lawmaking apparatus of Article V has no doubt served as an impetus
to group organizing around questions of constitutional law, for the
possibility of changing the Constitution's meaning through constitutional lawmaking stimulates citizens to articulate grievances about
constitutional interpretation to each other and not merely to the
Court. Beliefs about the Constitution as foundational law play a role
here as well. One cannot appeal to the Constitution as meaning
something other than what legal authorities say without persuading
other members of the community that one's claim about the meaning
of the Constitution is correct.
Struggles over the Constitution are conducted in many social settings, through a wide variety of institutional pathways and practices.
Groups speak through the electoral process and the party system,
whether by petitioning, voting, or convening to address their representatives in legislative hearings concerning constitutional amendments or judicial appointments. Perhaps just as commonly, groups
endeavor to address constitutional questions by resort to channels of
communication outside the electoral process. Most prominently, citizens organize to secure constitutional amendments. But they also engage in litigation and employ various repertoires of protest (conventions, marches, civil disobedience) in the effort to communicate and
legitimate alternative understandings of the Constitution. Typically,
one group exercises multiple avenues of communication simultaneously as it endeavors to shape public understanding-the judgments
of lawmakers and citizenry alike.
As groups make claims that the Constitution, as foundational law,
speaks to various controversies, they elaborate the Constitution's
meaning with respect to different institutions and practices and so
continually refresh the text's normative ambit. Thus, the abolitionist
movement tied the Guarantee Clause to slavery," while the women's
movement tied it to voting. The Thirteenth Amendment's prohibi-

standings decades before the nation is ready to entertain them as plausible constructions of the Constitution's meaning).
63 ERic FONER, RECONSTRUCTION:
AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 232-33
(1988).

64 See Reva B. Siegel, She the People:
The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex Equality, Federalism, and theFamily, 115 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming 2002) (Sept. 4, 2001, manuscript at
45-51, on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review).
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tion on slavery has been the focal point of protests about work, segreOver the life of the republic, groups have
gation, and marriage .
that would nationalize family law
amendments
sought constitutional
in order to restrict divorce," outlaw child labor,6' or prohibit same-sex
marriages. '8 The groups that organized for and against the woman's
suffrage and equal rights amendments also struggled over the ideal
9
forms of family life, as I develop in more detail below.

13 See Risa L. Goluboff, The Thirteenth Amendment and the Lost Origins of Civil Rights,
50 DUKE L.J. 1609, 1637-79 (2001) (discussing the rediscovery and reconstruction of
the Thirteenth Amendment as a means of vindicating and framing civil rights in the
1940s); Lea S. Vandervelde, The Labor Vision of the Thirteenth Amendment, 138 U. PA. L.
REV. 437, 475-95 (1989) (considering labor movement arguments that the Thirteenth
Amendment addressed, in addition to slavery, the working conditions of former
slaves); Joan G. Zimmerman, The Jurisprudenceof Equality: The Women's Minimum Wage,
the FirstEqual Rights Amendment, and Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 1905-1923, 78J. AM.
HIST. 188, 211 (1991) (discussing an early draft of the ERA, introduced in the 1920s,
that was modeled on the Thirteenth Amendment and declared: "Neither political nor
legal disabilities on account of sex or coverture shall exist within the United States or
any place subject to its jurisdiction" and "[t]he idea lingering behind the use of the
Thirteenth Amendment model was that marriage under the common law was a form
of involuntary servitude for women").
66 Various groups seeking to restrict divorce proposed constitutional amendments
that would give the federal government power to enact uniform marriage and divorce
legislation. For some accounts, see NELSON MANFRED BLAKE, THE ROAD TO RENO: A
HISTORY OF DIVORCE IN THE UNITED STATES 130-51 (1962); and WILLIAM L. O'NEILL,
DIVORCE INTHE PROGRESSIVE ERA 238-61 (1967).
67 On the child labor amendment proposed in the early 1920s, see Bill Kauffman,
The Child Labor Amendment Debate; or, Catholics and Mugwumps and Farmers, 10 J.
LIBERTARIAN STUD. 139 (1992); and Richard B. Sherman, The Rejection of the Child Labor
Amendment, 45 MID-AMERICA 3, 3-13 (1963).
68 The cover page of a recent issue of the NationalReview proposes a constitutional
amendment providing that "[m]arriage in the United States shall consist only of the
union of a man and a woman," on the grounds that "[o]nly an amendment to the
Constitution can end the abuse of the judicial process and protect 1oth marriage and
democracy in America." NAT'L REV.,July 23, 2001, at cover; see also The Constitution: In
a
Need of Amendment, NAT'L REV., July 23, 2001, at 16 (arguing that there should be
constitutional amendment prohibiting gay marriage in order to thwart a perceived
'judicial campaign" to "override the wishes of the people"); Carey Goldberg, Quiet Ana
niversaiy for Civil Unions, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2001, at A14 (discussing the efforts of
amendment
constitutional
federal
a
secure
to
Marriage,
for
Alliance
group,
national
defining marriage as a union between a man and a woman). Such amendments are
already being ratified as part of state constitutions. For an analysis of social movement
mobilization and countermobilization to secure state constitutional amendments that
prohibit or allow same-sex marriage, see Douglas S. Reed, Popular Constitutionalism:
Toward a Theory of State ConstitutionalMeanings, 30 RUTGERS L.J. 871, 901-31 (1999).
69 See supra note 30 and accompanying text (discussing debates surrounding attempts to pass the ERA); infra text accompanying notes 96-104 (considering debates
over woman's suffrage).
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Just as the language of the Constitution acquires meaning as it is
drawn into new conflicts, constitutional argument can transform the
conflicts into which it is drawn. To make arguments about how the
Constitution, properly interpreted or amended, bears on particular
controversies, advocates frame the conflict in light of constitutional
values and the narratives understood to vindicate those values. The
conflict is thereby articulated in ways that invoke competing understandings of the nation's identity, memories, obligations, commitments, and ends. ° Interpretive reframing of conflict is further accelerated as groups recruit and mobilize members:
a process that
requires continual elaboration of the reasons why existing constitutional understandings and arrangements inflict harm.7'
Through such understandings and practices, all manner of social
conflicts are channeled into struggles over the Constitution's meaning, and the Constitution comes to serve as a discursive medium
through which individuals and groups engage in disputes about the
ideal forms of collective life.
As a general matter, constitutional theory models the making of
constitutional law in terms that do not notice, much less count as significant, the understandings and practices that I have been sketching.
Strauss presents this generally unarticulated consensus in unusually
strong form when he argues that group mobilization is not relevant to
72
questions of constitutional law.
Strauss contends that in a mature constitutional democracy,
amendments are usually "irrelevan[t]" as a vehicle of constitutional
change, and so he concludes that organizing for constitutional
amendments is generally "a mistake":
If amendments are in fact a sidelight, then it will usually be a mistake for

people concerned about an issue to try to address it by amending the

Constitution. Their resources are generally better spent on legislation,
litigation, or private-sector activities. It is true that the effort to obtain a

constitutional amendment may serve very effectively as a rallying point
70 For

some accounts that explore the role of narrative in
legal reason, see
ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM &JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LAw 110-64 (2000); L.H.
LARUE,

CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW AS FICTION:

NARRATIVE

IN THE RHETORIC

OF

AUTHORITY (1995); and LAW'S STORIES, supra note 54.
71 See infra text accompanying note
74 (discussing the role that interpretation
plays in the dynamics of social movement mobilization).
72 Cf supra note 1.9 and accompanying
text (discussing the ways Strauss converges
with and diverges from other constitutional theorists in advancing his argument for
common law constitutionalism).
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for political activity. A constitutional amendment may be an especially
powerful symbol, and it may be worthwhile for a group to seek an
amendment for just that reason. But in this respect constitutional amendments are comparable to congressionalresolutions, presidentialproclamations, or
declarations of national holidays. If they bring about change, they do so because
of theirsymbolic value, not because of their operative legal effect.

Strauss acknowledges that a constitutional amendment can be a
rallying point for political activity. But to the extent a constitutional
amendment has such effects, Strauss emphasizes it is functioning symbolically, like the declaration of a national holiday, and not exerting
force as law. On this account, law would appear to exert force instrumentally, not expressively-coercively, not semantically.
Is such a distinction intelligible? It is in fact difficult to distinguish
the "symbolic value" of a constitutional amendment from its "operative legal effect," as Strauss suggests we ought. Even if one imagines
law exerting force in the form of directives backed by sanctions as
Strauss seems to do when he distinguishes the "operative legal effect"
of a constitutional amendment from "congressional resolutions,
presidential proclamations, or declarations of national holidays," law's
efficacy as a tool for regulating conduct would still seem to depend on
pathways of understanding. Perhaps Strauss is emphasizing that what
makes "law" is its coercive force, its power to shape behavior through
threat of sanctions; and that, therefore, what motivates groups to mobilize for law reform (as distinct from seeking the declaration of a
presidential holiday) is the objective of managing social life through
the manipulation of such sanctions.
But social change is effectuated through the contestation of meanings, not merely the manipulation of sanctions, as groups organizing
for constitutional reform over the life of the republic have long
known. Reasoning about our constitutional tradition through the filter of instrumentalist assumptions that Strauss brings to the question
will systematically exclude much of what motivates Americans-on
and off the bench-to assume positions in constitutional controversies.

74

73 Strauss, Irrelevance,supra note 1, at 1467 (emphasis added).
74 There is now a growing body of literature devoted to exploring the ways that

expressivist concerns animate bodies of law that are justified on consequentialist or
instrumentalist grounds. As Elizabeth Anderson and Richard Pildes observe:
[E]ven where rhetorical structures of justification in judicial opinions invoke
consequentialist (or functional or instrumental) language, the patterns of decision are best understood in expressive terms. Just as public discourse over
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In discussing whether Americans should mobilize for constitutional amendments, Strauss does not present himself
as arguing for a
particular approach to interpreting constitutional amendments,
but
instead as analyzing their efficacy in our constitutional
order, from the
standpoint of a sophisticated and frank kind of legal realism.
But his
argument for the irrelevance of constitutional amendments,
and the
immateriality to constitutional law of the organizing
activities that
bring them into being, illuminates certain assumptions
about how
constitutions are law that deeply shape the interpretive
practices
through which we adduce constitutional meaning. After
all, the "operative legal effect." of a constitutional amendment does
not inhere in
the constitutional amendment. An amendment acquires
its meaning
through practices of interpretation that in turn presuppose
certain
understandings of what it means to have a constitution.
To restate
this point more concretely: The ways we imagine the
making of law
may well affect the ways we understand the meaning of
law.
How might the ways we reason about the dynamics
of constitutional change affect the ways we interpret Article V amendments?
I
explore this question below, as I consider Strauss's argument
for the
"irrelevance" of the Nineteenth Amendment.
III. THE "IRRELEVANCE" OF THE NINETEENTH AMENDMENT:
REFLECTIONS ON SOME WAYS A SOCIAL MOVEMENT
PERSPECTIVE
MIGHT INFORM CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION

The Nineteenth Amendment was ratified, whereas the
ERA was
not; Strauss thus rests the case for its irrelevance on somewhat
distinct
grounds. Rather than argue that constitutional law changed
without
resort to Article V processes, he argues that the same
legal changes
could have been accomplished within just a few years
without resorting to Article V processes. Reviewing the progress of the
campaign in
the Progressive Era, Strauss reasons that "a state-by-state
campaign for

certain policy issues is often carried out in consequentialist
language despite
the fact that people's views appear actually rooted in expressive
considerations, so too do modern Supreme Court constitutional decisions
often cloak
expressive considerations in non-expressive terms.

Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressivist
Theories of Law: A General Re-

statement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503, 1532 (2000) (footnote omitted).
For an influential
analysis of this dynamic in criminal law, see Dan M. Kahan,
7he Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 HARV. L. REV. 413 (1999).
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75
women's suffrage might also have succeeded" :

The Nineteenth Amendment certainly suppressed outliers; it made

women's suffrage uniform before it otherwise would have been. Beyond
that, probably the best estimate is that if the suffragists had been forced

to concentrate solely on the state level, they would have achieved substantial but not complete success within a few years.

Strauss asserts the superfluity of Article V processes on several
grounds. On the one hand, he emphasizes that the availability of state
legislative fora diminished the significance of the Constitution as a
source of law for enfranchising women. The movement could have
accomplished its goal by other means, even if it might have taken
more organizing work and so briefly delayed the movement's ultimate
victory. But Strauss's argument for the irrelevance of the Nineteenth
Amendment involves an additional and analytically distinct claim.
Strauss asserts that society's political norms had already changed in
favor of women voting by the time of ratification, and so resorting to
constitutional lawmaking played no significant role in forging the
change in political culture favoring recognition of women's right to
vote:
The Nineteenth Amendment is revealing in other ways about the limited
role of the formal amendment process in bringing about constitutional

change. A naive reader of the text of the Constitution would think that

racial minorities have voted since 1870 and that women have voted since
1920. That is true of women-there is no evidence of systematic subversion of the Nineteenth Amendment-but emphatically untrue of African-Americans. By 1920, American society really had changed to the
point that it was willing to accept (and even insist on) women's sufSometimes amendments ratify a permanent shift in the politifrage. ....
cal culture; sometimes they do not. The lack of resistance to the enforcement of the Nineteenth Amendment reveals that it fell into the

former category. But in either event, what controls the pace f change is the
culture, not the amendment.

When Strauss asks about the importance of enfranchising women under the Federal Constitution, he presumes that a consensus to enfranchise women has formed in "political culture" that can be enforced
through an act of lawmaking, whether under federal or state law. For
Strauss, it is a matter of indifference whether this consensus is en75Strauss, Irrelevance, supra note 1, at 1502.
76

Id. at 1502-03.

77 Id. at 1503 (emphasis added).
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forced through federal or state law; Article V, on his account, is a
lawmaking tool like any other.
Strauss explicitly carries this account of constitution making into a
claim about constitutional meaning. Strauss argues that because Article V is a lawmaking tool like any other, Article V amendments, such
as the Nineteenth Amendment, should play no special role in the ways
we interpret any other provision of the Constitution:
These arguments [for synthetic interpretation] presuppose that amending the Constitution-and, by implication, failing to amend the Constitution-is a significant event. If this supposition is true, a formal, textual
amendment might legitimately be read back into other provisions of the
Constitution to produce a result that would not be warranted without
the formal amendment. But if the amendments carry no special significance-if they are not the principal means (or even an important
means) by which the People change our constitutional order-then
these interpretive approaches lose their foundation. It may be correct to
interpret the Fourteenth Amendment to forbid gender discrimination,
and the movement toward greater equality for women, including
women's suffrage, may be a legitimate reason to interpret the Fourteenth Amendment this way. But the fact that women's suffrage was
formally recognized by the Nineteenth Amendment-instead of coming
about through, for example, state legislation orjudicial interpretationshould not carry great weight.

Strauss argues that because constitutional reform through Article V
resembles ordinary acts of lawmaking, we should not consider the
Constitution's subsequent amendment as we interpret its earlier enacted provisions. Women could have secured the right to vote by diverse legal means, so there is no reason to pay special attention to ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment as we interpret older
provisions of the Constitution, such as the Fourteenth Amendment's
Equal Protection Clause.
In what follows, I want to show how a particularly restricted picture of constitutional lawmaking as an instrumental activity shapes the
ways Strauss reasons about the Nineteenth Amendment, and to suggest how analyzing the Amendment from a social movement standpoint-and from a standpoint of constitutional culture rather than
78

Id. at 1502-03.

Id. at 1467 (footnotes omitted); see also id. at 1466 (observing
that "[o] thers have
invoked the Nineteenth Amendment, which guarantees women's suffrage, as a reason
for interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment to forbid gender discrimination across
the board" and remarking that such "an interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment
...appears inconsistent with the original understanding of that provision").
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constitutional lawmaking-might alter the way we understand it today.
In other words, I will be considering how the frameworks in which we
analyze constitutional change shape the ways we understand the
meaning of an Article V amendment.
Many constitutional lawyers would find provocative Strauss's claim
about the irrelevance of constitutional amendments, but few would
invoke the Nineteenth Amendment as a ground on which to contest
it. In my experience, few constitutional lawyers even know "which
We read the Nineteenth
one" the Nineteenth Amendment is.
concerning voting with
rule
nondiscrimination
a
as
Amendment
suggests we ought:
Strauss
as
it
treat
we
which we now comply, and so
as a matter of constitutional irrelevance. I have elsewhere argued that
we read the Amendment as irrelevant because we read it shorn of any,
80
semantically informing context, but would like here to demonstrate
how instrumentalist assumptions about an amendment of the sort
Strauss articulates also play an important role in restricting its meaning.
To begin discussion of this question, I want to establish that there
are alternatives to reading the Nineteenth Amendment as Strauss and
most literate constitutional lawyers do: that is, as a nondiscrimination
rule that only concerns voting. One alternative interpretive framework is to read the Amendment in light of the norms and understandings that animated its passage. Akhil Amar, for example, reads the
Nineteenth Amendment as embracing a certain background understanding of civil and political rights; he contends that the Amendment, properly interpreted, should protect women's right to serve in
81
office and on juries.
80 Reva B. Siegel, Collective Memory and the Nineteenth Amendment: Reasoning About
"the Woman Question" in the Discourse of Sex Discrimination,in HISTORY, MEMORY, AND THE
LAW 131, 133 (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearnes eds., 1999).
81 See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION
274 (1998) (arguing that the Fifteenth and Nineteenth Amendments should be read
together to guarantee women the right to serve on juries); Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of
Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1202-03 (1991) (suggesting that the Nineteenth Amendment's sex-equality principle might apply to political rights so that it
would have implications for military and jury service); Akhil Reed Amar, Women and the
Constitution, 18 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 465, 471-72 (1995) (arguing that the Nineteenth Amendment stands for "full rights of political participation" for women, in addition to voting rights). For another argument that the Nineteenth Amendment bears
on conduct other than voting, see Sarah B. Lawsky, Note, A Nineteenth Amendment Defense of the Violence Against Women Act, 109 YALE L.J. 783 (2000), arguing that the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 is valid legislation under the Nineteenth Amendment.
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We could take another step and read the inclusion of the Nineteenth Amendment in the Constitution as having implications for diverse bodies of constitutional law. In the immediate aftermath of ratification, the Supreme Court drew on both these modes of
interpretation-historical and synthetic-to strike down a sex-based
minimum wage law in Adkins v. Children'sHospital, reasoning that the
gender understandings of substantive due process doctrine under the
Fourteenth Amendment changed with the ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment." Recently, I have also drawn on historical and
synthetic modes of interpretation to argue that we ought to read the
Nineteenth Amendment in light of the debates about sex equality,
federalism, and the family that led to its ratification, and, with this
understanding, to read the Fourteenth and Nineteenth Amendments
together as empowering Congress to enact laws securing women
equality in family life. 814 On this account, the debate over whether
women should be enfranchised under the Constitution, which lasted
from the Reconstruction to the Progressive Era, constitutes an important, and totally neglected, chapter in the history and traditions of
"our federalism."
This Article is not the place to pursue alternative interpretations
of the Nineteenth Amendment in any detail. Rather, I wish only to
suggest how ignoring, or exploring, the social movement roots of the
82

261 U.S. 525 (1923).
Id. at 553; see also Siegel, supra note 64 (manuscript
I8
at 56) ("The Court took [the

Nineteenth Amendment] into account as it reasoned about the gendered structure of
substantive due process doctrine in the aftermath of the amendment's ratification.").
84 Siegel, supra note 64 (manuscript
at 56). For another approach to synthetic interpretation of the Fourteenth and Nineteenth Amendments, see Michael C. Dorf, A
Textual Basis for an Anti-Discrimination Principle (2001) (unpublished manuscript,
on file with author) (arguing for an "incorporationist" account of the Equal Protection
Clause that reads the Fourteenth Amendment in light of the nondiscrimination provisions contained in the First, Fifteenth, Nineteenth, and Twenty-Sixth Amendments).
VickiJackson has recently advanced the case for reading the Constitution holistically in
light of its recent amendment. She argues:
The Fifteenth (1870), Nineteenth (1920), Twenty-Fourth (1964), and TwentySixth (1971) Amendments all sought to expand and secure the right to vote.
They thus can be read as elaborations of the basic message of equality of national citizenship founded in Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Their
frequency and relative currency vis-A-vis 1789 makes plausible the argument
that these amendments should be understood as importantly redefining what
the basic values of this Constitution are and to some extent revising our understanding of what the powers of the national government are.
Vicki C. Jackson, Holistic Interpretation: Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer and Our Bifurcated Constitution, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1259, 1290-91 (2001) (footnotes omitted).
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Nineteenth Amendment might bear on the ways we understand its
meaning today. What understanding of Article V lawmaking produces
the "thin" Nineteenth Amendment that Strauss and most other constitutional lawyers presently dismiss as "irrelevant"? What shift in perspective might produce a "thicker" understanding of the Nineteenth
Amendment as the site of normative struggle of continuing relevance
to the ways we interpret the Constitution today? More specifically,
how might examining the dynamics of mobilization and countermobilization around the Woman Question alter our judgments about the
Nineteenth Amendment's normative ambit or subject matter concerns?
When Strauss reasons about the importance of enfranchising
women under the Constitution, he presumes that a consensus to enfranchise women has formed in "political culture" that can be enforced through an act of lawmaking, whether under federal or state
law. Here, as elsewhere, Strauss reasons from a classically instrumentalist view of constitutional lawmaking; he assumes that the purpose of
law is to enforce society's norms by regulating the conduct of those
who would resist them." But we need not assess the dynamics of constitutional change only at the point that the Constitution becomes an
instrument for compelling resisting states to grant women the right to
vote. Instead we could explore the role the Constitution played in
forming the "political culture" favoring the enfranchisement of
women that Strauss's analysis assumes. Such an inquiry would start
well before large numbers of Americans thought it unjust to deny
women the vote and would examine the role that debate over the
Constitution played in forming this understanding.
In what follows, I identify some ways in which debates over the
Constitution helped transform the United States from a society in
which male suffrage was an unquestioned norm to a society in which
restrictions on women voting were understood to violate democratic
values. This brief sketch of suffrage history illustrates how core understandings and practices of our constitutional culture helped create the
political consensus that was ultimately memorialized in the Constitution through an act of Article V lawmaking. This alternative account
of constitution making, I suggest, has implications for the ways we reaSee Strauss, Irrelevance, supra note 1, at 1503 ("[W]hat controls the pace of
change is the culture, not the amendment.").
See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text (discussing the instrumentalist view
R,

of constitutional law on which Strauss's argument rests).
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son about the Constitution's meaning.
Debates over the Constitution helped create and give defining organizational shape to the nineteenth-century woman's suffrage
movement. It was the Republican Party's decision to exclude woman
suffrage from the Reconstruction amendments that riveted the attention of the nineteenth-century woman's rights movement on the goal
of enfranchising women under the Constitution. After failing in its
effort to intervene in the drafting of the Civil War Amendments, the
movement split into two organizations that differed about whether to
support former abolitionist allies in the Republican Party by pursuing
suffrage as a state law reform or to challenge the Republican Party
over the terms of the post-war constitutional order.""
Under the leadership of Susan B. Anthony and Elizabeth Cady
Stanton, the National Woman's Suffrage Association (NWSA) began
to claim the right to vote through interpretive and amendatory claims
on the Federal Constitution, which the movement advanced in a variety of venues. While Stanton and Anthony initially responded to ratification of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments by seeking a
new constitutional amendment that would protect women's right to
vote, they soon abandoned this effort to lead a grassroots campaign
that was premised on the view that women were already entitled to vote
under the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the newly ratified Fourteenth Amendment."
As part of this "New Departure" strategy for interpreting the postwar Constitution, movement leaders petitioned Congress for a Section
Five statute declaring that the Fourteenth Amendment protected

In the antebellum period, the woman's rights movement used the
Declaration
of Independence as a template for its inaugural Declaration of Sentiments. Infra note
98 and accompanying text. In this period, however, suffrage was but one of the
movement's claims, of no greater significance than efforts to reform the law of marriage, and possibly of lesser significance. See STEVEN M. BUECHLER, THE TRANS87

FORMATION OF THE WOMAN SUFFRAGE MOVEMENT:

THE CASE OF ILLINOIS, 1850-1920,

at 3841 (1986) (describing shifts in the breadth of the movement's demands over the
course of the nineteenth century). Unquestionably all of the movement's reform energies were focused on state governments during the antebellum era. Id. at 56-60.
88 See ELLEN CAROL DUBOIS, FEMINISM AND SUFFRAGE:
THE EMERGENCE OF AN
INDEPENDENT WOMEN'S MOVEMENT IN AMERICA, 1848-1869 (1978) (demonstrating

how the first organization of the suffrage movement arose out of post-war conflicts
over the Constitution).
89 For a full account of the movement's
constitutional claims, in the era of the
New Departure and after, see Siegel, supra note 64 (manuscript at 20-26).
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women's right to vote, "° while women across the nation engaged in
civil-disobedience voting designed to produce test-case constitutional
litigation. In so doing, the post-war movement self-consciously built
9
upon abolitionist constitutional theory; ' but it publicized its interpretive claims using startlingly modern techniques to contest and transform constitutional meaning-in the courts as well as the court of
public opinion. ' It was only in 1875, when the Supreme Court definitively ruled in Minor v. Happersett,1 that the Fourteenth Amendment
did not protect women's right to vote that NWSA concertedly began
to pursue a constitutional amendment. Congress initially appeared
receptive to the Amendment, 4 but the movement did not secure its
ratification for another three decades.
In the decades of struggle over the question of women voting that
ensued, NWSA and the American Woman Suffrage Association
(AWSA) petitioned, lobbied, and demonstrated in an effort to secure
the right to vote under federal and state law. To achieve these objectives, suffragists had to present their case in terms calculated to persuade a male electorate to support their cause; yet they also had to argue their case in terms that would persuade a historically
disfranchised female electorate to join their ranks. In the process, the
movement's efforts to secure constitutional change changed the
meaning of women voting. As one considers the dynamics of mobilization and countermobilization, one can better appreciate how the
quest for constitutional reform imbued woman suffrage with powerful
symbolic and associative significance.
In addressing the male audience whom they were attempting to
persuade to enfranchise women, suffragists made claims about inter-

9O Id. at 23.

Lobel, supra note 14, at 1356; Siegel, supra note 64 (manuscript at 23 & n.64);
Adam Winkler, A Revolution Too Soon: Woman Suffragists and the "Living Constitution,"
1869-1875, 76 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1456, 1468-69 (2001).
92 For some accounts of the New Departure, see Ellen Carol DuBois, Outgrowing
the Compact of the Fathers: Equal Rights, Woman Suffrage, and the United States Constitution,
1820-1878, in WOMAN SUFFRAGE AND WOMEN'S RIGHTS 81, 98-106 (1998); Lobel, supra
note 14, at 1364-75; Siegel, supra note 64 (manuscript at 22-23); Winkler, supra note 91,
at 1458-59.
93 88 U.S. 162
(1875).
94 In 1882, both houses of Congress appointed select committees on woman's suffrage, each of which recommended passage of an amendment; in 1887, the Amendment was brought to a vote on the Senate floor, where it was defeated. ALEXANDER
91

KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE:
UNITED STATES 185 (2000).

THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF DEMOCRACY IN THE
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preting or amending the Constitution that drew on core values, understandings, and memories of American political life. This was so
during the period of the New Departure, when the movement was arguing for enfranchisement by interpretation, and after, when the
movement was arguing for enfranchisement by amendment. '5 The
movement depicted self-representation as a foundational right in the
American constitutional tradition, " and contested the claim that
women were represented in the state through male heads of households by demonstrating all the ways that the law failed fully or fairly to
represent women's interests. 7
The movement often argued that women's right to vote was already protected
by the Constitution in the course of advocating that the Constitution be amended to
recognize women's right to vote:
By every principle of fair interpretation we need no new amendment, no new
definitions of the terms "people," "persons," "citizens," no additional power
conferred on Congress to enable this body to establish a republican form of
government in every State of the Union; and whenever our rulers are ready to
make the experiment they will see that they already possess all the constitutional power they need to act, and that the right of suffrage is, and always was,
the inalienable right of every citizen under government.
HearingBefore the S. Comm. on Woman Suffrage, S. Misc. Doc. No. 50-114, at 3 (1888)
(statement of Elizabeth Cady Stanton). Susan B. Anthony stated that:
The Constitution of the United States as it is protects me. If I could get a
practical application of the Constitution it would protect me and all women in
the enjoyment of perfect equality of rights everywhere under the shadow of
the American flag.
I do not come to you to petition for special legislation, or for any more
amendments to the Constitution, because I think they are unnecessary, but
because you say there is not in the Constitution enough to protect me. Therefore I ask that you, true to your own theory and assertions, should go forward
to make more constitution.
Arguments of the Woman-Suffrage Delegates: HearingBefore the S. Comm. on theJudiciary, S.
Misc. Doc. No. 97-74, at 12 (1880) [hereinafter 1880 Senate Hearing] (statement of
Susan B. Anthony).
96 See, e.g., HearingBefore the S. Comm. on Woman Suffrage,
S. MISC. Doc. No. 53-121,
at 25 (1894) (remarks of Sara Winthrop Smith) ("The right of women to vote began
with the first pronunciamento against the tyranny of England. It is as firmly placed in
the fundamental laws of our country as is the same right of men."). The call to
NWSA's eighth annual convention declared that "the Declaration of Independence
was the first national assertion of the right of individual representation. That 'governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed,' thenceforward
became the watchword of the world. Our flag, which beckons the emigrant from every
foreign shore, means to him self-government." Call for the Eighth Annual Washington
Convention (1876), nprinted in 3 HisTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE 3 (Elizabeth Cady
Stanton et al. eds., 1886) [hereinafter 3 HWS].
97 See generally Siegel, supra note 64 (manuscript
at 40-41) (noting as examples unfair employment compensation and marital property rules, and a lack of protection
against physical coercion in marriage).
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As they constructed constitutional arguments to contest the justice
of women's disfranchisement, suffragists repeatedly invoked the
memory of the American Revolution. In 1848, the woman's rights
movement had drafted its inaugural Declaration of Sentiments in the
language of the Declaration of Independence," and from this first
enumeration of grievances onward, challenged women's disfranchisement by invoking the nation's revolutionary heritage. Memories
of the Revolution may well have provided the only narrative resources
that were powerful enough to contest the discourse of familialism
99
Suffragists
through which women's disfranchisement was justified.
infrequent
their
in
king
and
colonists
of
relations
the
invoked
tacitly
in
and
representation,"
without
vocation of the creed "no taxation
their repeated efforts to demonstrate how a regime of virtual reprel °°
sentation provided women no effective representation at all. During
the 1870s-the decade of the Centennial-suffragists augmented the
civil disobedience voting protests of the New Departure with a wave of
tax protests that framed their quest for the vote in the traditions of colonial revolutionary protest. ]0
See Declaration of Sentiments (1848) (describing the "history of mankind [as] a
history of repeated injuries and usurpations on the part of man toward woman, having
in direct object the establishment of an absolute tyranny over her"), reprinted in I
HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE 70, 70 (Elizabeth Cady Stanton et al. eds., 1881).
90 Compare the testimony of
Elizabeth Saxon:
I beg of you, gentlemen, to consider this question [the Sixteenth Amendment] apart from the manner in which it was formerly considered. We, as the
women of the nation, as the mothers, as the wives, have a right to be heard, it
seems to me, before the nation. We represent precisely the position of the
colonies when they plead, and, in the words of Patrick Henry, they were
"spurned with contempt from the foot of the throne." We have been jeered
and laughed at, and ridiculed; but this question has passed out of the region
of ridicule.
1880 Senate Hearing,supra note 95, at 6 (statement of Elizabeth L. Saxon).
,00 For example, Mary Stewart testified that:
We are taxed without representation; there is no mistake about that. The
colonies screamed that to England; Parliament screamed back, "Be still; long
live the King, and we will help you." Did the colonies submit? They did not.
Will the women of this country submit? They will not. Mark me, we are the
sisters of those fighting revolutionary men; we are the daughters of the fathers
who sang back to England that they would not submit. Then if the same
blood courses in our veins that courses in yours, dare you expect us to submit?
1880 Senate Hearing,supra note 95, at 6-7 (statement of Mary A. Stewart); see also Siegel,
supra note 64 (manuscript at 39) (observing how suffrage arguments based on the Declaration of Independence and the Tides of Nobility and Bills of Attainder Clauses
evoked memories of the Revolution).
101On the tax protests, see LINDA K. KERBER, NO CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE
98
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By invoking the nation's revolutionary heritage to contest the justice of women's representation through the family, the movement
constructed a powerful challenge to male suffrage; no other political
narrative offered such a potent rejoinder to men's claim to represent
women in the state. And yet, precisely as suffragists invoked core understandings of the American political tradition to justify the claim
that women's right to vote should be protected by the Constitution,
suffragists were advancing a politically explosive reinterpretation of
gender relations in the family and in the state.10 2 Male superordination was not benign, but tyrannical, 10 and fundamentally unjust. 104

LADIES: WOMEN AND THE OBLIGATIONS OF CITIZENSHIP 81-123 (1998).
See also
KEYSSAR, sulpra note 94, at 182 ("In scattered locales throughout the country, women
refused to pay their taxes as long as they were prevented from voting, insisting that it
was unconstitutional to impose the obligations of citizenship on them while they were
deprived of political rights."). On the woman suffrage protests held during the Centennial, see 3 HWS, supra note 96, at 27-31. Belva Lockwood, the first woman to run
for President, gave a speech at an 1878 NWSA convention that pressed the movement's
revolutionary themes to unusually explicit extremes. Lockwood argued:
The only way for women to get their rights is to take them. If necessary let
there be a domestic insurrection. Let young women refuse to marry, and
married women refuse to sew on buttons, cook, and rock the cradle until their
liege-lords acknowledge the rights they are entitled to. There were more ways
than one to conquer a man; and women, like the strikers in the railroad riots,
should carry their demands all along the line.
Belva A. Lockwood, Remarks at the Tenth Washington Convention (Jan. 9, 1878), reprinted in id. at 73.
102 Elizabeth Cady Stanton pursued
this strategy quite self-consciously:
But what do lofty utterances and logical arguments avail so long as men,
blinded by old prejudices and customs, fail to see their application to the
women by their side? Alas! gentlemen, women are your subjects. Your own
selfish interests are too closely interwoven for you to feel their degradation,
and they are to dependent to reveal themselves to you in their nobler aspirations, their native dignity.
Argument of Isabelle Beecher Hooker Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 42d Cong. (1872)
(statement of Elizabeth Cady Stanton), reprinted in 2 HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE 510
(Elizabeth Cady Stanton et al. eds., 1882).
103 See Declaration of Sentiments, supra
note 98, at 70 (drawing on the Declaration
of Independence to describe the "history of mankind [as] a history of repeated injuries
and usurpations on the part of man toward woman, having in direct object the establishment of an absolute tyranny over her").
104 The movement emphasized this theme
during the Centennial celebrations on
July 4, 1876, when Susan B. Anthony stood in front of Independence Hall and read
from NWSA's Declaration of Rights for Women:
Universal manhood suffrage, by establishing an aristocracy of sex, imposes upon
the women of this nation a more absolute and cruel despotism than monarchy; in that, woman finds a political master in her father, husband, brother,
son. The aristocracies of the old world are based upon birth, wealth, refine-
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The threat was not limited to the claims about male power that
arguments from the Revolution implicitly, or explicitly, advanced.
Suffragists demonstrated their claims about the injustice of men representing women by pointing to the many ways that laws made by men
served male interests. 0 5 This critique of virtual representation was not
merely aimed at the male audience that the movement was endeavoring to persuade; it was also aimed at the disfranchised women whom
the movement was endeavoring to attract to the suffrage cause.
For, during the many decades that the suffrage movement pursued constitutional reform, it was not merely attempting to persuade
those with power to share it; it was also attempting to persuade those
without power to join its ranks. Throughout this period, suffragists
attempted to recruit new members to their cause by demonstratingthrough movement newspapers, conventions, and protests-how disfranchisement harmed women. As the movement endeavored to persuade women why they needed the right to vote and so should join its
ranks, the movement tied the right to vote to all manner of social
concerns ranging from pay equity and job access to family law concerns, including marital rape and expropriation of the value of
women's household labor.0° As the movement widened its class base,
it also began to represent the enfranchisement of women as a means
to "social housekeeping": a world in which women would have a say in
the regulation of municipal services and the industrial conditions in
which they and their children worked.

ment, education, nobility, brave deeds of chivalry; in this nation, on sex alone;
exalting brute force above moral power, vice above virtue, ignorance above
education, and the son above the mother who bore him.
Declaration of Rights for Women (1876), reprinted in 3 HWS, supra note 96, at 33; see
also A Sixteenth Amendment to the Constitutionof the United States Prohibitingthe Several States
from DisfranchisingUnited States Citizens on Account of Sex: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on
Privileges and Elections, 45th Cong. 5 (1878) (testimony of Elizabeth Cady Stanton)
("When we place in the hands of one class of citizens the right to make, interpret, and
execute the law for another class wholly unrepresented in the government, we have
made an order of nobility. Universal manhood suffrage makes all men sovereigns, all
women slaves-the most odious form of aristocracy the world has yet seen.").
1'5 Cf supra note 102 (quoting Elizabeth Cady Stanton making this claim).
07 Siegel, supra note 64 (manuscript at 40-41).
107

See AILEEN S. KRADITOR, THE IDEAS OF THE WOMAN SUFFRAGE MOVEMENT,

1890-1920, at 66-71 (W.W. Norton & Co. 1981) (1965) (discussing the argument that
women needed the vote in order to secure the health and welfare of their families); see
alsoJane Addams, iWy Women Should Vote, in ONE WOMAN, ONE VOTE: REDISCOVERING
THE WOMAN SUFFRAGE MOVEMENT 195 (Marjorie Spruill Wheeler ed., 1995) (providing the classic expression of this argument). On the expansion of the class base of the
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For some time now, historians of the woman suffrage movement
have characterized this shift in movement rhetoric as a shift from 'justice"-based to "expedience"-based arguments for the vote."' But this
way of characterizing the movement's efforts to recruit women to the
suffrage cause seems to castigate suffragists for engaging in forms of
advocacy that are a normal phase of mobilization, which social movement theorists refer to as frame alignment: a movement's attempt to
represent or reinterpret daily life in terms calculated to move individuals to action.'09 If one analyzes mobilization for constitutional
change from the standpoint of the frame alignment literature, it becomes much easier to understand how the woman suffrage question
came to be systematically associated with a range of challenges to male
prerogatives and power, by proponents and opponents alike.
During the half-century spanning the Reconstruction and Progressive Eras, as the movement advanced its interpretive and amendatory claims on the Constitution, social movement activity insistently
associated the question of women voting with core understandings of
the American constitutional tradition and, at the same time, associated women's suffrage with challenges to a variety of gendered institutions and practices, the male-headed household first among them.
Thus, as the polity struggled over the question of whether the American democratic tradition required the enfranchisement of women, it
was simultaneously wrestling with the challenges to male privilege that
the woman suffrage movement voiced as it recruited women to the
suffrage cause and attempted to refute the claim that women were
represented in the state through the men of their households.
In this period, prior to ratification, even though there had yet
suffrage movement in the first decades of the twentieth century, see ELLEN CAROL
DuBois, HARRIOT STANTON BLATCH AND THE WINNING OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE 94-106

(1997).
108

KRADITOR, supra note 107, at 52-74.

109 See David A. Snow et al., Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Move-

ment Participation,51 AM. SOC. REV. 464, 464 (1986) (defining "frame alignment" as
"the linkage of individual and SMO [social movement organization] interpretive orientations, such that some set of individual interests, values, and beliefs and SMO activities, goals, and ideology are congruent and complementary"). For an overview of recent scholarship that explores how social movements produce meaning as a predicate
to collective action, see FRONTIERS IN SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY (Aldon D. Morris &
Carol McClurg Mueller eds., 1992). For an analysis of the women's movement that
draws on several branches of this scholarship, see Verta Taylor & Nancy Whittier, Analytical Approaches to Social Movement Culture: The Culture of the Women's Movement, in
SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND CULTURE 163 (Hank Johnston & Bert Klandermans eds.,
1995).
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been no act of constitutional lawmaking, the Constitution was nonetheless shaping social life: debates about the Constitution's meaning
channeled conflict about a variety of gendered institutions, practices,
and understandings into the question of women's right to vote." 0 The
arguments of suffragists and their opponents tied the idea of women
voting to the prospect of women's emancipation from traditional roles
in marriage and the market. Once the question of woman suffrage
was infused with this social meaning-once the question of woman
suffrage was known simply as the "woman question"-the nation's debate about whether women should vote turned into a referendum on
a whole range of gendered institutions and practices. It was because
the question of women voting was so symbolically charged that the
debate over the Constitution lasted as long as it did.
Analyzed from this standpoint, the woman suffrage movement was
less successful than Strauss depicts. The woman suffrage movement
obtained the right to vote, and with recognition of this right moved
closer to the social world it aspired to realize through enfranchisement, but by no means did ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment
bring about the social transformations that its proponents sought and
its opponents feared. The movement's mixed record of accomplishment can be traced to many causes, among them internal divisions in
the ranks of the broad-based social movement that coalesced around
the goal of enfranchisement and diverse forms of backlash that the
movement's very success in securing change precipitated."'
Indeed we can see anxieties about the changes precipitated by enfranchisement as playing a role in the interpretation of the Nineteenth Amendment itself. The Supreme Court initially interpreted
the Nineteenth Amendment in light of the social meanings of the suffrage campaign.
Adkins treated ratification of the Nineteenth
Amendment as marking an epochal transformation in gender relations that had structural significance for the interpretation of other
bodies of constitutional law;"l2 yet, neither the Supreme Court nor
many state courts maintained this approach for long thereafter.' 13 In"o

See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 106 ("[T]he movement tied the right to

vote to all manner of social concerns ranging from pay equity and job access to family
law concerns .... ).
1 See Siegel, supra note 64 (manuscript at 55 n.185) (citing sources that examine
post-ratification responses to the Nineteenth Amendment).
112 Id. at 56 (analyzing Adkins v. Children's Hospital,261 U.S. 525
(1923)).
"1 See id. at 60-61 (noting that, in the aftermath
of the Nineteenth Amendment's
ratification, some federal and state courts "interpreted the suffrage amendment as dis-
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stead, courts began to interpret the Amendment in ways that stripped
the question of women voting of the social meaning it acquired during the long course of the suffrage campaign. Through such practices
of interpretation, federal and state courts domesticated the suffrage
amendment and helped transform it into a rule devoid of larger constitutional significance.
To this point I have been exploring aspects of the Nineteenth
Amendment's history that are visible if one puts aside paradigms concerned with lawmaking and instead examines the role that our constitutional culture played in supporting social movement organization
around the question of enfranchising women. We may then wish to
ask: how might considering the Nineteenth Amendment from a social
movement perspective bear on the ways we interpret it today? A full
answer to this question plainly exceeds the bounds of this Article. For
present purposes, I wish to observe only the following.
Just as we can reason about the significance of Article V in a
framework that focuses on acts of constitutional lawmaking or the understandings and practices of constitutional culture, we can reason
about the meaning of Article V amendments in these different analytical frameworks, as well. Do the constitution-making efforts of past
generations of Americans matter to us only as they impose constraints
on us? If this is our relation to preceding generations-if our sole interest in their undertakings is to ascertain the forms of compulsion to
which they have subjected us-then our interest in their constitutional
undertakings is accordingly restricted to determining the content and
scope of the injunctions they have promulgated for us. If, however,
we stand in a different relation to prior generations, if their struggles
are of significance to our own constitutional undertakings not merely
as law that constrains us but as history that might inform and shape
the ways that we understand and justify our own acts of constitution
making, then we will want to know very different things about constitutional deliberations of the past.
The question thus turns on the ways we understand the role of
history in constitutional argument. Most commonly, constitutional
theory depicts constitutional history within a lawmaking framework, as
important insofar as it reveals the nature and scope of constraints that
114
But if we examine ordinary practices of constitutional arbind us.
establishing the marital status traditions of the common law" but that "this understanding of constitutional reform never gathered significant momentum").
14 Constitutional theory invokes history as a ground
for constitutional law in a
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gument and justification, it is plain that in our constitutional culture
we also turn to history as a source of narrative understanding. It is history that supplies the narrative materials through which we forge the
collective subject-"We the People"-that is realized through the
practice of constitutional argument; and it is history that supplies the
field of collective experience through which we make pragmatic
judgments about how to realize constitutional commitments and values in practice. This kind of appeal to history, as a source of narrative
understanding, of collective identity, and of practical judgment about
constitutional values, is a fundamental feature of our constitutional
culture, regularly invoked in constitutional argument inside and outside the courts.
Considered from the standpoint of constitutional culture, then,
history matters, but not for the reasons constitutional theory most
commonly identifies: as a source of law or compulsion. However
much we venerate the Founders, we do not live under the Constitution as a regime of paternal authority, as the law of the father. Rather,
we live under the Constitution as "our" Constitution, as a framework
in which we make decisions through which we are constituted and for
which we are responsible, as a people. On the latter account, the past
exerts force, not as it binds our choices but as it informs our choicesas it guides them and gives them meaning. We look to the past as we
make pragmatic judgments about how to vindicate constitutional values in the present. And we look to the past as we struggle to define
ourselves as a nation acting in history, united imaginatively and ethically across generations as well as communities.
As one reflects on the practices of appealing to the past that play
such a central role in constitutional argument both inside and outside

wide variety of paradigms. Theories of originalism and textualism treat the history of
the Constitution's making as a constraining source of law, while other practices and
schools of interpretation approach the Constitution in a manner akin to an informing
tradition, and accordingly approach the past for an understanding of the nation's
identity, customs, and accumulated wisdom in practical matters concerning the vindication of constitutional values.
15 Identitarian
and ethical modes of reasoning each have temporal, crossgenerational extension. Jed Rubenfeld argues that concepts of self-government, properly understood, incorporate temporal extension as well. On his account, written constitutionalism is properly understood as a nation's struggle to lay down and live out its
own fundamental political commitments over time. SeeJED RUBENFELD, FREEDOM AND
TIME: A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT 11 (2001) (arguing that
"democratic self-government is itself something that exists, if it exists at all, only over
time").
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of the courts, it is apparent that history matters in constitutional argument because the Constitution's authority resides in forms of understanding, and not merely threats of compulsion. With this more
expansive understanding of the role of history in constitutional argument, we have reason to take account of constitutional mobilizations
that satisfy Article V criteria of lawmaking and those that do not, of
constitutional interpreters that hold elected or appointed office and
those that do not, and of constitutional claims that secure formal recognition and those that do not. Our interest in the life of the Constitution in times past extends beyond the understandings of those we
designate "framers" and the acts we characterize as lawmaking to the
nation's experience living under the Constitution as both the nation
and its Constitution evolve in history. And if we act with this understanding of the role of history in constitutional reason, it is plain that
the "thick" account of the Nineteenth Amendment's roots in social
movement struggle bears-in myriad ways-on how we interpret the
Constitution today. " "
To cite one locally germane example: the history of the Nineteenth Amendment teaches that in our constitutional culture, no institutional authority, not even the Court, has the power to fix the Constitution's meaning in a way that can insulate it from challenge.
Indeed, the history of social movement challenges to prevailing constitutional orthodoxies shows that in our constitutional culture, mobilized citizenry have played a central role in forging constitutional understandings that we now venerate as core features of our
constitutional order. Mobilized groups of citizens realized these alternative understandings and aspirational visions of the American
constitutional order through a variety of transformative practicessometimes with the help of a responsive judiciary, and, as the Nineteenth Amendment reminds us, sometimes by overcoming deeply entrenched resistance in the representative branches of government as
well as the courts.

IP For a full elaboration of this argument, see Siegel, supra note 64, which demonstrates how the history of the suffrage struggle bears in different ways on the various
branches of constitutional doctrine that the Supreme Court invoked in justification of
its decision in United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000), to strike down provisions
of the Violence Against Women Act.
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CONCLUSION

Over the life of the Republic, social movements have played a significant role in shaping constitutional understandings, but constitutional theory barely recognizes the role that constitutional mobilizations play in the construction of constitutional meaning. In this
Article, I trace the marginalization of social movements in constitutional theory to a tendency among constitutional theorists to model
relations that bear on constitutional interpretation in paradigms of
lawmaking-a set of restrictive criteria for determining when constitutions change and how.
Relations between citizenry and judiciary, as well as between past
and present generations of Americans, continuously shape the production of constitutional meaning, but through more complex pathways than lawmaking paradigms recognize. When David Strauss disparages the significance of text and amendment in our constitutional
tradition," 7 he is in fact reasoning about text and amendment within
conventional accounts of constitutional lawmaking. But if we analyze
the question from the standpoint of constitutional culture, we can see
that text and amendment play a more significant role in our tradition
than Strauss's account of common law constitutionalism and other
court-focused constitutional theories recognize. Text matters in our
tradition because it is the site of understandings and practices that
authorize, encourage, and empower ordinary citizens to make claims
about the Constitution's meaning.
In our constitutional culture, elected officials and ordinary citizens understand themselves as authorized to make claims about the
Constitution's meaning and regularly act on this understanding in a
wide variety of social settings and through an array of practices, only
some of which are formally identified in the text of the Constitution
itself. Considered from this positive standpoint, courts are not the
Constitution's sole expositors; instead, as judges interpret the Constitution they are regularly informed by, and intervene in, controversies
about the Constitution that are proceeding outside of the courts.
Political scientists, sociologists, and historians can describe these
relationships, to be sure, but constitutional theory needs to generate
richer positive descriptions of them as well. The Rehnquist Court is
presently refashioning numerous bodies of doctrine that regulate re-
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lations between Congress and the Court."8 These doctrines were
premised on an understanding, forged in the mid-twentieth century,
that Congress and the Court each had responsibilities for constitutional interpretation, within its proper sphere."1 ' As the Rehnquist
Court abandons practices of deference to congressional lawmaking
that have been entrenched in constitutional doctrine since the midtwentieth century in favor of practices of aggressive judicial review, it
stakes its constitutional prerogative to strike down federal laws on the
view that judicial interpretation of the Constitution restricts other
branches from reasoning about its meaning.
The Court first began to emphasize this view in City of Boerne v. Flo120
res, in the course of striking down the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). In Boerne, the Court was plainly provoked by what it
viewed as a congressional challenge to its authority to interpret the
Constitution.12' Whether or not Congress's use of its powers under
Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment to enact the RFRA represented such a challenge, the case certainly involved the two branches
of the federal government in a dispute about the framework that
would best vindicate free exercise values; Congress publicly announced that it was enacting the RFRA to provide legislative protection for free exercise rights in a framework that the Supreme Court
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The Court is striking down provisions of various civil rights statutes on the

grounds that Congress lacked the power to enact them. See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of
Ala. v. Garrett, 121 S. Ct. 955 (2001) (Americans with Disabilities Act); Morrison, 529
U.S. at 598 (Violence Against Women Act); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62
(2000) (Age Discrimination in Employment Act).
11 See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 535 (1997) ("When
Congress
acts within its sphere of power and responsibilities, it has not just the right but the duty
to make its own informed judgment on the meaning and force of the Constitution.
This has been clear from the early days of the Republic.").
120 Id.
121 The Court stated:
Our national experience teaches that the Constitution is preserved best when
each part of the Government respects both the Constitution and the proper
actions and determinations of the other branches. When the Court has interpreted the Constitution, it has acted within the province of the Judicial
Branch, which embraces the duty to say what the law is. Marbury v. Madison,
[5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)]. When the political branches of the Government act against the background of ajudicial interpretation of the Constitution already issued, it must be understood that in later cases and controversies the Court will treat its precedents with the respect due them under settled
principles, including stare decisis, and contrary expectations must be disappointed.
521 U.S. at 535-36.
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had rejected2 in one of its recent decisions interpreting the Free Exer2
cise Clause.1
But in subsequent cases, the Court has invoked Boerne as precedent for striking down federal laws that Congress enacted with no
thought of creating legislative alternatives to the Court's interpretation of the Constitution: for example, the provisions of the Age Dis23
crimination in Employment Act in Kimel,1 provisions of the Violence
r4
Against Women Act in Morrison,1 and provisions of the Americans
5
with Disabilities Act in Garrett.1 In adopting these laws, Congress understood itself to be exercising its powers under the Commerce Clause
and Fourteenth Amendment to enact civil rights legislation, just as it
had done regularly during the second half of the twentieth century.
The separation-of-powers problem in these cases appeared, not because Congress differed with the Court about the Constitution's
meaning, but because the Court adopted a new, and less deferential,
doctrinal framework for reviewing exercises of congressional lawmaking.
The new doctrinal framework that the Court adopted for evaluating exercises of congressional power under Section Five-Boerne's
"congruence and proportionality" test-emphasizes that the Court
must closely scrutinize exercises of congressional lawmaking to ensure
that Congress does not encroach on the Court's prerogative to interpret the Constitution.'6 In adopting the Boerne test, the Court gives
Congress manifestly less deference in exercising an enumerated
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For discussion of the struggle between the Court and Congress, see Post & Sie-

gel, supra note 13, at 453.
528 U.S. at 91.
124 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000).
125 Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 121 S. Ct. 955, 963-68 (2001).
26 As the Court explained in Boerne.
Congress does not enforce a constitutional right by changing what the right is.
It has been given the power "to enforce," not the power to determine what
constitutes a constitutional violation. Were it not so, what Congress would be
enforcing would no longer be, in any meaningful sense, the "provisions of
[the Fourteenth Amendment]."
While the line between measures that remedy or prevent unconstitutional
actions and measures that make a substantive change in the governing law is
not easy to discern, and Congress must have wide latitude in determining
where it lies, the distinction exists and must be observed. There must be a
congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end. Lacking such a connection, legislation may become substantive in operation and effect.
521 U.S. at 519-20 (alteration in original).
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power than is ordinarily the case in our constitutional order,' 27 and it
does so on the stated ground that congressional lawmaking involving
constitutional interpretation that varies from the Court's threatens the
integrity of our constitutional order. Completely obscured is the possibility that, by reason of institutional differences between Congress
and the Court, legislative and judicial interpretation of the Fourteenth
21
Amendment might legitimately differ.
127 See, e.g.,
Garrett, 121 S. Ct. at 975 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("The courts'
harsh review of Congress' use of its § 5 power is reminiscent of the similar (now-discredited)
limitation that it once imposed upon Congress' Commerce Clause power."); 1
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 5-16, at 959 (3d ed. 2000)
("[L]aws enacted by Congress pursuant to § 5 suddenly [have] been saddled with
something between intermediate and strict scrutiny .. ").
12
This theme is the focus ofJustice Breyer's dissent
in Garrett.
The problem with the Court's approach is that neither the "burden of
proof" that favors States nor any other rule of restraint applicable to judges
applies to Congress when it exercises its § 5 power. "Limitations stemming
from the nature of the judicial process ... have no application to Congress."
Rational-basis review-with its presumptions favoring constitutionality-is "a
paradigm ofjudicial restraint." And the Congress of the United States is not a
lower court.

There is simply no reason to require Congress, seeking to determine facts
relevant to the exercise of its § 5 authority, to adopt rules or presumptions
that reflect a court's institutional limitations. Unlike courts, Congress can
readily gather facts from across the Nation, assess the magnitude of a problem, and more easily find an appropriate remedy. Unlike courts, Congress directly reflects public attitudes and beliefs, enabling Congress better to understand where, and to what extent, refusals to accommodate a disability amount
to behavior that is callous or unreasonable to the point of lacking constitutional justification. Unlike judges, Members of Congress can directly obtain
information from constituents who have first-hand experience with discrimination and related issues.
Moreover, unlike judges, Members of Congress are elected. When the
Court has applied the majority's burden of proof rule, it has explained that
we, i.e., the courts, donot "'sit
as a superlegislature to judge the wisdom or desirability of legislative policy determinations." To apply a rule designed to restrict courts as if it restricted Congress' legislative power is to stand the underlying principle-a principle ofjudicial restraint-on its head. But without the
use of this burden of proof rule or some other unusually stringent standard of
review, it is difficult to see how the Court can find the legislative record here
inadequate. Read with a reasonably favorable eye, the record indicates that
state governments subjected those with disabilities to seriously adverse, disparate treatment. And Congress could have found, in a significant number of
instances, that this treatment violated the substantive principles of justification-shorn of their judicial-restraint-related presumptions-that this Court
recognized in Cleburne.
121 S. Ct. at 972-973 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). For some of the constitutional theory literature exploring differences in legislative and judicial interpreta-
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Boerne and its progeny break with the doctrinal frameworks-and
institutional understandings-through which the Court has defined
Congress's power to enact civil rights legislation since the beginning
of the second Reconstruction.'IV The separation-of-powers problem
that the Court now perceives in federal civil rights legislation appears
because-in matters concerning the Fourteenth Amendment, at
least-the Court now imagines itself as solely responsible for interpreting the Constitution s meaning.
Courts do play a central role in constitutional interpretation, and
today most in our constitutional culture believe that courts have the
final word in constitutional controversies properly presented to the
Court.'30 But the concept that courts play a central role in constitutional interpretation, or have the last word in constitutional controversies properly before them, is by no means the same as the claim the
Court is now seemingly advancing: that the democratic branches of
government have no independent authority to interpret the Constitution once the Court has declared its meaning.
What resources does constitutional theory offer to evaluate the
picture of our constitutional order depicted in Boerne and its progeny?
Considerably fewer than it otherwise might, because so much of constitutional theory is court-centered in its account of constitutional interpretation. For the last several decades of the twentieth century,
constitutional theory wrestled with the charge that judicial review was
"counter-majoritarian" or otherwise antidemocratic. But it now needs
to explore a different question: in our constitutional tradition what is
the role for constitutional interpretation outside the courts? Juricentric accounts of our constitutional tradition, such as Strauss's account
of common law constitutionalism, do not address such questions but
may lend tacit support to the picture of our constitutional order that
undergirds Boerne.
What we need instead are more empirical and theoretical resources for wrestling with the deep questions of interpretive authority
that Boerne raises. For instance, under what circumstances do diver-

tion of the Constitution, see supranote 13.
121) Post & Siegel, supra note 13, at 486-502, 513-22.
IS0For a historical account of concepts of judicial supremacy and modern challenges to it, see Kramer, supra note 13.
III Cf, Garrett, 121 S. Ct. at 968 ("[T]o uphold the Act's application to the States
would allow Congress to rewrite the Fourteenth Amendment law laid down by this
Court in Cleburne.").
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gent understandings of the Constitution vitalize our tradition, and
when do they pose a threat to it? What kinds of conformity best serve
and preserve the Court's authority to say what the law is?
Any account of the Court's role in constitutional interpretation
must locate the Court among the many institutions and individuals
that make claims about the Constitution's meaning. As this Article
has argued, there is much work to be done in describing the role that
nonjuridical actors play in shaping constitutional meaning, whether
citizens speak in the streets, in Congress, in the executive branch, or
through lawyers in the courts. By no means do all chapters of this
story involve nonjuridical actors defying judicial authority-unless we
propose to treat every claim about the Constitution's meaning that is
advanced by a nonjuridical actor as a challenge to the Court's authority to say what the law is. That would certainly amount to a novel, and
dramatic, departure from the understandings and practices composing our constitutional tradition. To the contrary, we need to understand judicial review as a practice that regularly occurs in the midst of
constitutional mobilizations, and so frequently involves courts intervening in constitutional disputes that are unfolding among constitutional interpreters outside the courts. The complex questions of institutional role and institutional authority in matters of constitutional
interpretation raised by the Court's recent Section Five cases fall outside the boundaries of this Article, 13 but one important aspect of the
question lies at its core: The Court regularly interprets the Constitution amidst competing claims about its meaning, and does not, and
cannot, establish its authority by silencing alternative understandings.
Polyvocality in matters of constitutional interpretation regularly
occurs in our constitutional culture. When citizens engage in constitutional interpretation, they enact and reinforce understandings of
the Constitution's democratic authorship. The fact that elected officials and ordinary citizens are making multiple and conflicting claims
about the Constitution's meaning need not be a threat to the Court's
authority and, in our democratic constitutional culture, may well be a
necessary condition of it. If citizens and elected officials concern
themselves with constitutional questions, they are engaged in a common enterprise with the Court, even when they are in disagreement
with the Court. Active engagement with constitutional questions may

For a more extended analysis of the Section Five
question, see generally Post &
Siegel, supra note 13.
132
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well produce fidelity to constitutional values in ways that passive obedience to the Court's authority cannot. Further, when the Constitution has multiple and socially dispersed interpreters, the Court is
likely to interpret the Constitution in ways that are informed by evolving popular judgments about the Constitution and issue judgments
that find support among a diverse array of social actors. The fact that
the Court must often decide cases in ways that run against popular
sentiment does not mean that it can dispense with the need for popular support. In matters that genuinely arouse popular passions, the
Court requires popular engagement with constitutional questions to
secure its authority.
A look at our constitutional history suggests that judicial supremacy is, in important respects, a collaborative practice, involving the
Court in partnerships with the representative branches and the People themselves. All of these relationships are in fact part of the Little
Rock story, properly understood. As I have elsewhere argued, without
the executive branch, the Congress, and the civil rights movement itself, the Court could not have fashioned or enforced the Brown " v.
33
Board of Education. opinion on which its modem reputation stands. "
What tacit picture of constitution making will fund decisions
about the respective roles of Congress and the Courts in matters of
constitutional interpretation? This is an "internal" question of constitutional theory that deserves a much thicker positive description of
practice in our constitutional tradition than constitutional theorists
have thus far provided. If we describe the understandings and practices that support communication about constitutional meaning in
our constitutional order, examine the rich and varied histories of constitutional mobilizations, and trace the genealogy of venerated constitutional concepts, we will discover that the Constitution's popular
authorship is not merely legal fiction. In our tradition, the People
continue to play a role in authoring constitutional understandings in
ways that involve acting inside and outside formal processes of law.
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347 U.S. 483 (1954).
Post & Siegel, supra note 13, at 516.
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